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 It has been more than five decades since the wave of decolonization swept across Africa. 
For people on the continent, the rise to power by the former liberation movements brought 
hope for a better future in the post-colonial state. However later developments showed 
that independence would, in fact, not change the material and social conditions of the 
ordinary people. Although the national liberation movement took over the government of 
the former colony, colonial institutions and structures of power, which were founded on the 
economic exploitation of the colony, remained unchanged. Thus in this thesis I set out to 
examine Frantz Fanon’s thought in order to provide a critique of post-independence failures 
in Africa. I will argue that whilst Fanon shared the same ideals as the anti-colonial 
movements in their objective to remove colonial regimes from power, that Fanon, in fact, 
had a critical attitude towards the anti-colonial movement. Whereas the latter conceived of 
freedom as independence, Fanon conceived of freedom as disalienation, premised on the 
complete recovery of the black self from the negative effects of colonialism. Thus the study 
sets out to examine the extent to which Fanon offered an alternative idea of freedom and 
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Introduction 
It has been more than five decades since the first African country Ghana secured its 
independence from European colonial rule. Since then the entire African continent became 
politically independent, with South Africa becoming the last country to secure its freedom. 
This was symbolized by the country’s first democratic elections which took place in 1994. 
But the euphoria of African independence gradually turned into disappointments. The 
transfer of political power to the liberation movements did not improve the economic 
fortunes of the majority of people in the post-liberation state. If anything the reality of post-
independence only managed to sink the post-liberation state into stagnation. Thus in this 
thesis, I set out to examine Frantz Fanon’s thought as providing a critique of the problems 
emanating from the post-independence African state. 
Frantz Fanon was born on 20th July 1925 in Fort-de-France, Martinique. He was born into a 
black, middle class family of eight children. In Black Skin, White Masks (1986:148) and 
Toward the African Revolution (1967:19-21) he regards the Antillean as believing himself to 
be a French man. From this we can assume that Fanon grew up regarding himself as French 
also. He was a third-generation descendant of slaves that were transferred from Africa to 
the Caribbean Islands. After an uneventful middleclass childhood, Fanon, at the age of 
seventeen escaped the island to the Dominican Republic in order to join the allied forces to 
liberate France which had been occupied by German forces. At this stage Fanon’s political 
awareness was still undeveloped because the war was between whites and had nothing to 
do with the liberation of his country, Martinique. He joined the French army and took part in 
the war against Nazi forces particularly in the battle of Alsace, where he was injured. After the war 
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Césaire, who Fanon supported, was running as a Communist Party candidate for the 
National Assembly.  
In 1946 he received a scholarship to study in France. Although he conceived himself as a 
French man, it was here during his second stay in France where Fanon suffered from the 
effects of white racism. These experiences raised his political awareness of the black man’s 
plight as regards racism. While in France, Fanon studied and graduated as a doctor in 
psychiatry. This prompted him to consider the symptoms and the effects of psychological 
trauma in order to understand the conditions under which blacks were subjected to in 
France. This work culminated into Fanon’s first book Black Skin, White Masks, a book which 
had previously been rejected as an academic dissertation (Macey 2000:155). After 
completing his studies in Lyon, France, Fanon took up an offer to work in Algeria as head of 
the Psychiatry Department at the Blida-Joinville Hospital. He inherited a racially segregated 
ward between European and Arab patients. He would desegregate the wards and introduce 
reforms in the way patients were treated. Some of these changes included the introduction 
of social and psychotherapeutic methods. However the social conditions under which 
people lived militated against the practice of psychotherapy.  
In his letter of resignation to the Resident Minister, which he signed as an “outraged French 
citizen” (Macey 2000:299), Fanon wrote: 
Madness is one of the means man has of losing his freedom. And I can say, 
on the basis of what I have been able to observe, from this point of 
vantage, that the degree of alienation of the inhabitants of this country 
appears to me frightening. 
If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to 
be a stranger to his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, 
permanently an alien in his own country, lives in a state of absolute 
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By this time Fanon had already developed sympathy for the cause of the Algerian people for 
national independence. As a psychiatrist, it was becoming clear to him that the social 
conditions under which people lived had to be transformed in order to make possible a 
healthy existence. Frustrated by these social conditions Fanon finally opted to join the ranks 
of the National liberation Front (FLN), Algeria’s national liberation movement whilst still 
pursuing his medical practice. These early developments form the biographical context in 
which Fanon’s theoretical work had its origins.  
Although Fanon supported the cause for the freedom and independence of Algeria and 
other colonised countries, it appears that Fanon had a critical attitude towards the anti-
colonial movement. On the one hand he shared with the national liberation movements the 
need for the removal of colonial regimes and the establishment of sovereign states. On the 
other, he was opposed to the idea of seeing liberation as merely political and therefore 
formal. The lack of a clear vision and ideology for the future state by the national liberation 
movements, accompanied by their inability to anticipate the prospective class rifts caused 
by the existence of differently privileged classes within the liberation movements, sets 
Fanon apart from the anti-colonial movement. While the liberation movement(s) called for 
universal franchise in the form of one man one vote, Fanon on the other hand, insisted on 
placing the masses at the centre of the political process. He argued for a people’s 
government not in the form of one man one vote, but a polity where the people themselves 
decide the destiny and the future of the state. 
Although in theory liberation movements espouse the aspirations of the masses for 
freedom, predicated on the eradication of hunger, ignorance, poverty and unawareness 
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bureaucracy to the point that liberation becomes a mere formality for the majority of the 
people.  It is at the backdrop of these problems that Fanon, in his last book The Wretched of 
the Earth1
Having noted the dehumanising effects of colonial violence on the colonised Fanon argued 
that counter violence by the colonized, in response to the violence of the colonizer, would 
help heal the colonised from his inferiority complex. The violence of the colonised acts as a 
balancing mechanism to the violence perpetrated by the coloniser. Through violence the 
“natives” create history, in that, the old colonial truths are exploded (Fanon 1967:117) while 
, develops a critique of the post-colonial state. His critique is particularly present 
in the chapters “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness” and “On National Culture”. These 
chapters indicate Fanon’s departure from the line of the liberation movement in 
anticipating the problems of the post-colonial state. In the Wretched, Fanon presents a 
political programme which firstly calls for the radical transformation of the colonial system 
through the use of violence. His conception of violence within the context of the revolution 
differs from that of the liberation movements. While he shares with the liberation 
movement the necessity of the use of violence in toppling the colonial regimes, Fanon also 
conceives of violence as working therapeutically in aiding the colonized individual to regain 
his self-confidence and humanity. Secondly Fanon presents a political programme that is 
aimed at the creating a revolutionary national, political culture aimed at replacing the 
ideology of the colonial system. His project, as presented here in this thesis can be summed 
up in the following manner: i) critique of the impact of the colonial system, and 
subsequently the critique of the national bourgeois state, ii) the creation of a new national 
culture, aimed at the full recovery of the black-self.  
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at the same time that new ones are being created. As Fanon puts it: “the thing which has 
been colonised, becomes man in the process of freeing itself” (1967:28). 
While the national liberation movement succeeds in dethroning the colonial regime, covert 
elements within the liberation movement move to take over positions which are a legacy of 
colonialism. These are the national elites who, once colonialism has retreated, establish a 
state which is only formally independent, complicit with the imperialist forces in the former 
colonising country. Since independence, the compradorial activities of the national 
bourgeoisie have undermined the development of the nation state. So Fanon proposes that 
the bourgeoisie ought to abandon their class narcissism and join forces with the masses in 
revolt in order to repel imperialism and build a new nation. He argues that the national 
bourgeoisie, as beneficiaries of colonial education, rather than becoming local agents of 
foreign companies, ought to put their intellectual and technical resources in the service of 
the revolution. He says that the bourgeoisie “ought to consider as its bounden duty to 
betray the calling fate has marked out for it, and to put itself to school with the people” 
(1967:120). This entails aiding the people and working with the people, not against them.  
In saying this Fanon has in mind the establishment of a new national culture, a revolutionary 
culture concerned with the full recovery of the black self. He argues that decolonisation 
should not only bring about an end to colonialism but should also lead to a disappearance of 
the colonised man. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon says that “when there are no longer 
slaves, there are no longer masters” (1986:219).    
 Thus through a close reading of Fanon’s ideas I hope to show Fanon, both ethically and 
politically, as concerned with the humanistic objective of transforming the “natives” from 
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Accordingly he critiques formal independence as preserving the psychological damage of 
colonialism. He goes on to set out the political conditions that make possible a healthy life 
after colonialism.  
In his conception of social transformation I will show Fanon as drawing from the rich history 
in the philosophical thought of thinkers such as Hegel, Marx and Sartre. In doing so, I seek to 
demonstrate that while Fanon draws on these authors’ theories; he also transcends them in 
such a way that he produces an original theory of social transformation for the black or the 
colonised people. This enables Fanon to distinguish between false liberation, that is, 
liberation based on the acquisition of state power without fundamentally changing the old 
colonial relations and institutions, and genuine liberation which he conceives as the product 
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Chapter 1: Power and Alienation under Colonial Rule 
If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process: primarily economic; 
subsequently, the internalisation—or, better, the epidermalization of that inferiority.  
          Frantz Fanon  
Since the arrival of European colonialism in Africa, Asia and Latin America the histories of 
these continents has come to be known as part of Europe’s colonial crusades in these 
regions. Through conquest and domination, colonialism managed to displace traditional 
communal relations and in the process imposed its own standards. Taking into account the 
traumatic experience from the encounter with colonialism this chapter will focus on the 
“native” population’s alienation that resulted from that encounter. This is with the view to 
showing how colonialism tilted power relations in favour of the colonising power. In doing 
so, I will rely on Fanon’s critique of colonialism in order to examine its impact of on the 
colonised people. 
 As is the case in the Hegelian dialectic of recognition, Fanon’s argument is that the 
enslavement of the colonised, under the dehumanising colonial conditions, raises an 
awareness of the need by the colonised people to extricate themselves from colonial 
bondage towards a realisation of their freedom. For Fanon violence becomes a key 
instrument towards this end. The first section will focus on Fanon’s analysis of the colonial 
situation, its economic rationale and also how colonialism through exploitation transforms 
the socio-economic relations between the colonised and the colonising countries. The 
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colonialism. The last section will focus on violence as a mode of recovering the black self in 
Fanon’s project together with the limits of violence.  
1.1 Colonialism 
In Fanon’s thought there is an interplay between colonialism’s economic exploitation of the 
“native” populations, racial discrimination and the use of violence. Race distinctions become 
an important determinant by which to divide the colony between “natives” and Europeans, 
that is, between the haves and the have-nots. Colonial violence, on the other hand, which is 
the violence of the settler against the “natives”, serves as a cohesive element first, to 
establish “order” within the colony and secondly to dehumanise the “natives” and thus 
reduce them to the level of slaves. Hence exploitation, racism and violence, under 
colonialism, are interwoven in such a way that the relation between the settler and the 
“native” is always an economic and exploitative one in the interest of the colonizing power.          
The brief account of colonialism rendered here is aimed at shedding light on some 
characteristic features of colonialism together with the economic rationale that underlies it. 
Fanon understands economic exploitation as the basis for colonialism. He understands that 
the exploitation of the colony is necessary for the economic development of the metropolis. 
Thus the relation is structural and is also one of dependency. Fanon acknowledges this fact 
as when he writes in Black Skin White Masks2
If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process: 
 that  
- primarily, economic;  
- Subsequently, the internalisation–or, better, the epidermalization of that 
inferiority (Fanon 1986:13). 
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Here Fanon is making the point that the colonial encounter is an economic encounter and 
that economic privilege is mediated through race, or as evidenced by the 
“epidermalisation” of privilege or lack thereof.   
In The Wretched of the Earth he declares that “The originality of the colonial context is 
that economic reality, inequality and the immense difference of ways of life never come 
to mask the human realities” (1967:30). 
Both these statements attest to Fanon’s awareness of the historical and economic 
rationale of the colonial system. Fanon deemed colonial exploitation as vital for the 
economic existence of the metropolis.  
In a similar vein Ania Loomba locates colonialism as grounded in the economic reality as 
Fanon does. She describes colonialism as “the take over of territory, appropriation of 
material resources, exploitation of labour and interference with political and cultural 
structures of another territory or nation…” (1998:6). In her description of colonialism Ania 
Loomba stresses the dependence between the colonised and colonising countries as 
centered around the economic exploitation of the former by the latter.  
As we can see here Loomba does not examine colonialism in isolation but ties the 
denigration of the colonized though labour to the economic demands of imperialist 
nations for raw materials and labour as contained in her definition. Her analysis of the 
colonial phenomenon shows that there is an inter-connection between the development 
of modern capitalism in the West and colonial expansion. She says that “Thus we could 
say that colonialism was the midwife that assisted at the birth of European capitalism, or 
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Europe” (1998:4). Like Loomba, Fanon deems colonial exploitation as vital for the 
economic development of the metropolis. He observes that: 
The bourgeoisie in the colonies is, before independence, a western 
bourgeoisie, a true branch of the bourgeoisie of the mother country that 
derives its legitimacy, its force and its stability from the bourgeoisie of the 
homeland (Fanon 1967:143).    
Here Fanon seeks to show that the colonial bourgeoisie, before independence, are 
representatives of the colonising country bourgeoisie and as such, are in line with the 
material interests of the colonizing country, and not the colony. As such the colonial 
bourgeoisie has no desire for the economic development of the colony but its 
exploitation.    
With exploitation as its objective, Fanon further observes that colonialism, therefore, 
cannot occur without the creation of socio-economic changes between the coloniser and 
the colonised. That, in fact, the terms “native” and settler are colonial notions that, 
through exploitation, have acquired material connotations. He says that “For it is the 
settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The 
settler owes the fact of his very existence, that is to say his property, to the colonial 
system” (Fanon 1967:28). Fanon does not deal with the historicity and motives of the 
colonial enterprise at length but his awareness of the exploitative nature of capitalism is 
scattered throughout his writings. In Capital and The Communist Manifesto Karl Marx 
provides background on the economic links between colonialism and capitalism from 
which Fanon draws.  
In Capital Marx locates the development of capitalist production as based on previously 
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original capital or what he refers to as “primitive accumulation” (Marx 1954:703,710-
712). Marx bases the notion of primitive accumulation on the complete separation of the 
producer from the products of his labour. Thus colonialism functions to strip the 
colonised from the products of their labour and thus serves the purpose of capital 
accumulation from which capitalist development in the metropolitan countries can take 
off. Marx notes, in Capital, that “the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial 
hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production” 
(1954:703). I have here alluded to the notion of primitive accumulation insofar as it 
relates to colonial exploitation, the principle of separating the worker from the products 
of his labour works in the similar way in the capitalist countries themselves as Marx points 
out in the book. Similarly Fanon’s understanding of the economic rationale of colonialism 
is broadly Marxian in interpretation. In the colonies, Fanon observes, the products of the 
“native’s” labour are consumed not by the “natives” who produce them, but are 
consumed in the industrial countries. He notes that “[colonialism] contents itself with 
bringing to light the natural resources, which it extracts, and exports to meet the needs of 
the mother country’s industries, thereby allowing certain sectors of the economy to 
become relatively rich” (Fanon 1967:127).  
Thus the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised is structured in such a way 
that it is always a material and an exploitative relationship. The exploitation is also based 
on the coloniser’s perception of the “native” as racially inferior, and therefore a potential 
object for economic exploitation.   
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Colonial rule in Africa depends on racial ideology. Race, under colonialism, functions 
ideologically according to which the division of society into Blacks and Whites, that is, 
between “natives” and human beings is determined. Thus race establishes a Manichean 
society consisting of separate schools and hospitals for Europeans and for the “natives”. 
Accordingly “The settler’s town is a well-fed town, an easy-going town;…a town of white 
people, of foreigners” (Fanon 1967:30). The “native” town on the other hand is described 
by Fanon as a “hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light…a town 
on it knees…wallowing in the mire” (1967:30). Fanon notes that “When you examine at 
close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to 
begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species” 
(1967:31). In essence a person’s material privilege, in a colonial system depends on his or 
her racial identity. Accordingly being white is associated with wealth while blackness with 
poverty. For this reason Fanon notes that in the colonies “The cause is the consequence; 
you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich” (1967:31).  
We have said that the division of society into Europeans and “natives” is mediated by race. 
But we are yet to fully appreciate the function of racism in dehumanizing the “natives”. 
Since colonialism is based on racial difference, racism therefore allows for a situation where 
the perpetrator of racism, the white man, to suspend ascribing human qualities to the 
“native” by reducing him to the level of an object. According to Percy More racism allows 
for a situation where the colonial masters can regard the “native” as an absolute other, 
even an enemy. Hence the black race is excluded because it is believed to be the “absolute 
Other, an enemy, a swart gevaar, against whom all whites must unite” (More 2008:51). 
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race” are those who hail from elsewhere and those who are racially different from the 
original inhabitants, “the others” (1967:31).  
Since racism allows for the suspension of human qualities to the colonized, dehumanization 
through racism justifies for the settler the barbaric atrocities and the plundering associated 
with colonialism. To prove the point, Fanon observes that the settler mentions the “native” 
in animal terms. The settler speaks of the “native” in “reptilian motions, of the stink of the 
native quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, of gesticulations” (Fanon 1963: 
32-33). He further notes that when the settler wishes to fully describe the “native” he refers 
to the bestiary (Fanon 1967:33). 
By reducing the “natives” to sub-human standards, through racism, this enables the 
colonizer to cling to Western ideals of liberal democracy, as Zahar observes, “while at the 
same time exploiting the natives in the most inhuman fashion” (Zahar 1974:19). This 
attitude on the part of the colonizer puts paid to the possibility of complementarity 
between races. It denies the possibility for conciliation and the achievement of a higher 
humanity. Noting these racial binaries Fanon remarks that “Obedient to the rules of pure 
Aristotelean logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is 
possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous” (1967:30). 
Percy More also regards racism as more than mere racial discrimination, but as power. 
According to More, if racism entails the practice of discrimination, then racism also entails 
the power to enforce discrimination. Taken from the point of view of the colonial system as 
whole, racism as an instrument of domination, “establishes and maintains exclusionary 
relations of superiority and inferiority…” (More 2008:51). It entails the power to control and 
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To have power on this basis is to have “power-over” the discriminated person or group. The 
implication for this is that within the colonial context, the distribution of power is highly 
asymmetrical between blacks and whites to the extent that the colonized person cannot be 
said to be racist in the manner we have just described. This is why Fanon at times uses the 
terms the “governing race” or the “dominant group” to refer to the colonizer. For Fanon 
restricts acts of racism to the colonizing race. It is also with this conception of racism as 
power that A. Sivanandan defines the term. As such racism “is the acting out of racial 
prejudice and not racial prejudice itself that matters…Racism is about power and not 
prejudice” (Cited in More 2008:51). The display of power and racial practices is shown 
through the use of force to keep the “natives” in line.      
1.1.2 Colonial Violence   
In the Wretched of the Earth Fanon notes that the dehumanization of the “natives” is 
mediated by sheer force. He notes that the encounter between the colonizer and the 
colonized “was marked by violence and their existence together – that is to say the 
exploitation of the native by the settler — was carried on by dint of a great array of 
bayonets and cannon” (Fanon 1967:28). He further says that “In the colonies, the foreigner 
coming from another country imposed his rule by means of guns and machines” (Fanon 
1967:31). Thus we see here that unlike in the West where legitimacy is obtained through 
soft cultural elements such as “moral teachers, counselors and ‘bewilders’” (Fanon 1967:29) 
who function to keep the masses in check, in the colonies government agencies do not seek 
to lighten oppression, but seek to escalate it through brute force. As Fanon puts it:  
The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the 
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conscience of an upholder of peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into 
the home and into the mind of the native (1967:29).   
Fanon’s assessment of colonial violence leads him to conclude that colonialism leads to 
dehumanisation. As it dehumanizes the “natives” and forces them to carry out purposes 
which are not of their own but those of the occupier, violence functions, simultaneously, to 
alienate the “natives” psychically and socially. Thus brutal violence—mediated by colonial 
racism—ensures the dehumanization and the alienation of the “natives”. The colonizers will 
therefore instill onto the “native’s” mind that the black or the “native” is not only the 
“corrosive element”, but is also an embodiment of evil. As Fanon notes, the colonizers will 
propagate the idea that the “native” “represents not only the absence of values but the 
negation of values” (1967:32). 
We have thus far noted how race based exploitation of the “natives” for metropolitan 
economic gains, through the use of violence and racism dehumanizes the black person. In 
the following section I shall examine how according to Fanon colonialism alienates the 
colonial subject as is detailed in Black Skin White Masks. 
1.2 Alienation 
In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon undertook to analyse the psycho-existential impact of 
colonialism on the colonized people, particularly the intellectual alienation of the Antillean 
society. In this endeavor Fanon observed that colonialism systematically corrodes the 
dignity of the black self while at the same time upholding Western values as was propagated 
by the Enlightenment thinkers. Over a period of time, and particularly among the “native” 
elites, this triggers the “natives” to despise their own cultures and adopt that of the 
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speaking evolués, abandon their culture and assimilate into the colonizing country’s culture 
they become alienated. This is so in that while the evolués have accepted European values 
and patterns of behavior, the racially organised social structure of colonial society 
undermines and denies their full recognition and integration into white society. This creates 
serious psychological traumas on them since they become neither fully black nor white. This 
phenomenon is best revealed when the evolués emigrates to metropolitan countries where 
they discover that their manners and eloquence particularly in French cultural etiquettes 
count for nothing; that in the eyes of whites they remain savages, or “Negroes”. As noted 
earlier this was also the case in Fanon’s own experience when he went for his university 
studies in France.    
Fanon notes that the black Antillean—who believes himself to be both a white and French 
man—will experience psychological disorders at the slightest contact with the white world 
(1986:143,148). In the colonial countries the cultural and economic domination of “natives” 
leads, among other things, to mental and intellectual alienation of the colonized person. 
While most colonized people will experience psychological traumas as the result of the 
physical and psychological abuse unleashed by colonialism, intellectual alienation tends to 
become more acute among the “native” elites who have become strongly exposed to 
colonial ideology as Zahar observes. This alienation results, among other things, from 
negative constructions of the “native” population’s identities as savage and backward, 
which lead them to despise their original identities. 
As an escape mechanism the alienated person abandons his own identity for that of the 
colonizer with the view to gaining recognition as a human being. By so doing he seeks to be 
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details different types of alienations, in this section I shall limit my discussion largely to 
intellectual alienation. Intellectual alienation is the type of alienation experienced largely by 
the “native” elites, particularly the French-speaking blacks in the Antilles for which Fanon 
directed Black Skin, White Masks to. Intellectual alienation points to the problem of an 
alienated person whose desire is not only to enjoy the white settler’s privileges but to 
become the white man himself.  However Fanon points out in Masks that “there is every 
reason to think that the situation is the same in other colonies” (Fanon 1986:146).  
As Fanon observed in his “native” Martinique, an island that fell into French colonial rule, 
intellectual alienation was more perverse on the island. This was due to French colonial 
policy of assimilation. Through its assimilation policy, France ensured that it did not only 
disfigure the cultures and the history of the “natives” but also sought to create French 
citizens out of them. It must be remembered that colonialism created and maintained 
artificial social hierarchies based on race and class. The more one evolved towards 
assimilating European or French values, the higher his social status in the hierarchy.  In the 
Antilles the colonized Antillean – a black man – was made to feel as though he was not only 
French but white as well. As such this made him believe superior to other Africans such as 
the Senegalese. As Fanon notes, in the Colonial Army for instance, the Antillean served in 
the European unit while the African (Senegalese) served in the native unit (1967:20). This 
shows such divisions were reinforced by the colonial system.  
Based on his study of Martiniquan society Fanon noted that before 1939, no Antillean 
thought of themselves to be a “Negro” or a black person (Fanon 1967:21). The Martiniquan 
believed that the Negro was a Senegalese and therefore lived in Africa. “Subjectively, 
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the colonised Antillean is ignorant of is the fact that for the coloniser all “negroes” (blacks) 
are savages: that according to the colonizer there are no good and bad Negroes. Noting this 
fact Fanon writes in the Wretched that 
Colonialism, which has not bothered to put too fine a point on its efforts, 
has never ceased to maintain that the Negro is a savage; and for the 
colonist, the Negro was neither an Angolan nor a Nigerian, for he simply 
spoke of ‘the Negro’ (Fanon 1967:170).     
Still of the Antillean, Fanon notes that when introduced to a group of white French 
intellectuals, the black will seek to assert himself as an equal through demonstrating his 
intellectual ability. “He will insist that attention be paid not on his skin colour but on his 
intellect” (1986:193). As an indication of alienation among Martiniquan society, many young 
men will accordingly be found, for instance, emulating French form of speech, recognizing of 
course “the world expressed and implied by that language” (Fanon 1986:18 my italics 
added).  Fanon views this behavior instrumentally as a road for these young men towards 
recognition. He observes rather cynically that within the white dominated world “The 
colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother 
country’s cultural standards” (1986:18). By accepting the culture of the mother country the 
Antillean expects his skin colour to be forgotten. This disappearance of skin colour allows 
them an opportunity to be recognized as French, and therefore men.  
Such manifestation of neurosis is summed up by Fanon as based on the following logic: “If I 
order my life like a moral man [a white man], I simply am not a negro” (1986:192). This is 
because in the collective unconscious of the black people under colonialism, black is 
regarded as a corrosive element, resembling all that is evil. In his mind the Antillean 
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1986:192). So by adopting the opposite of “black”, the Antillean believes he shall become 
white.  
The black evolués living under race based oppression are ignorant of the fact that the black 
suffers differently to the lighter skinned races. In most cases light skinned races tend to 
receive better treatment than blacks. When comparing the experiences of the Jews and 
black people, for example, Fanon notes, following Sartre, that the two groups suffer 
differently from one another. Echoing Sartre, Fanon notes that the Jew suffers as the result 
of an “idea” or stereotype that others have given him (1986:115-6). Based on this idea the 
Jew, according to Sartre, is “perpetually overdetermined from the inside” 1986:115). 
Accordingly the Jew lives in fear that “his actions might correspond to the stereotype” 
(Sartre cited in Fanon 1986115). Although Fanon concedes that the Jew will be persecuted 
for being a Jew, as it happened during the Holocaust, but since he is a white man, the Jew 
can remain unnoticed in who he is. “He [the Jew] is a white man, and apart from some 
rather debatable characteristics, he can sometimes go unnoticed” (Fanon 1986:115). Thus 
the Jew can escape persecution by concealing his Jewishness.   
The black person, on the other hand, suffers a racialised existence, or as Fanon puts it he 
suffers as the result of his “corporeality” (1967:163). This means that when the Jew can 
conceal his Jewishness, the black simply can’t: he cannot hide the fact that he is black for his 
skin colour is the most conspicuous manifestation of race. Through his own personal 
experience with metropolitan racism in France, Fanon came to the realisation that “I am the 
slave not of the ‘idea’ that others have of me but of my own appearance” (1986:116). So we 
see here that when the black man is lynched it is not necessarily because of a stereotype or 











20 | P a g e  
 
skin colour that he becomes a victim of racial hatred. The stereotype of being a savage is 
embedded, primarily on him being a black person. On this basis Fanon concludes that if the 
Jew is overdetermined from the inside, the black man is “overdetermined from without” 
(1986:116). This problem is best captured by Fanon when he writes that 
But it is in his corporeality that the Negro is attacked. It is as a concrete 
personality that he is lynched. It is as an actual being that he is a threat 
(1986:163).   
Based on this Fanon infers that in an anti-black world “the black man is not a man” 
(1967:10).  
This problem of black (and Jewish) alienation adds another existential dimension to it. In an 
anti-black world, Fanon notes that the black person also encounters behavioral challenges in 
the development of his bodily schema when in the presence of a white man. As he puts it 
“Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity…The body is surrounded by an 
atmosphere of certain uncertainty” (1986:110-111) when it comes to muscular or motor 
reactions. This problem manifests when the black encounters what Fanon calls the “white 
gaze”. 
In his first book Frantz Fanon begins the chapter on “The Fact of Blackness” with these 
opening lines:  
I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my 
spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I 
found that I was an object in the midst of other objects (1986:109). 
The conclusions that Fanon draws in this paragraph is in my view the result of what 
constitute the problem of the white gaze. The “crushing objecthood” (1967:109) that 
Fanon associates with the white gaze is itself the result of psychological disorders that 
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a concept that was developed by Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness from which 
Fanon draws significantly. Although the analyses of the impact of the look are similar, 
there are important differences between the two authors’ analyses as I shall demonstrate 
below. I will begin by Sartre’s analysis of the concept and then show how Fanon 
developed it.   
For Sartre the behavioural problem of what he terms “the look” or the gaze of the other 
emerges as an objective ontological phenomenon that an individual experiences when 
being looked at by another. Sartre entitles his book Being and Nothingness as “an essay 
on the phenomenological ontology” which, in effect, is a study of the consciousness of 
being in the world. For Sartre, as it is for Fanon, the gaze of the other is an alienating or 
objectifying experience. The major premise of Sartre’s argument is that human beings 
become conscious of themselves through the reflection they see of themselves in the 
other’s gaze. This is because self-consciousness (what he refers to as being-for-itself) is at 
bottom a “nothingness”. Although self-consciousness exists in some form or another it is 
because of this nothingness that self-consciousness is unaware of itself. Therefore the 
gaze of the other becomes alienating in that it is when we are being looked at that we 
become aware of ourselves and our presence in the world. “All of a sudden I am 
conscious of myself as escaping myself, not in that I am the foundation of my own 
nothingness but in that I have my foundation outside myself. I am for myself only as I am 
reference to the Other” (Sartre 1958:260). 
Shame and pride become instrumental in the perception of self through the other as an 
object. Shame is necessitated by the realisation that all of a sudden I have become an 
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Being seen by the other not only objectifies and dehumanises one but also has the effect 
of disorienting one from his relation with the physical world. The one who is looked at 
discovers that he now cannot conduct himself normally. This is well put by Sartre when he 
writes that  
But suddenly the alienation of myself, which is the act of being-looked-at, 
involves the alienation of the world which I organise. I am seen seated on 
the chair…[but the chair]…escapes me so as to organise itself into a new 
and differently oriented complex…in the midst of other objects which 
similarly have for me a secrete face (1958:263).    
This passage indicates that alienation for Sartre occurs as an ontological and existential 
phenomenon. Alienation arises as a matter of one self-consciousness confronting 
another. For Sartre the alienated individual, the one who is being looked at, has a chance 
of disalienating himself. His alienation is not a permanent condition: he still remains with 
his possibilities. Sartre argues that the other as a look “is only that—my transcendence 
transcended” (1953:263) and therefore can be overcome. As shame and pride lead self-
consciousness to the recognition of its object status, those same dimensions of the ego 
become instrumental in the re-establishment of the recognition self-consciousness. For, 
each self-consciousness strives toward a positive affirmation of self. “It is shame or pride 
which makes me live”, says Sartre, “not to know the situation of being looked at” 
(1958:263). Thus through shame and pride the individual, simultaneously, seeks to 
reverse his objectivity and reclaim his freedom. 
For Fanon it is insofar as “the look” is alienating that he becomes interested in the 
concept. But what Fanon does is to adapt the concept to the colonial context, and by so 
doing introduces the racial element to it. His genius is to be able to anticipate the 
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ontological phenomenon as in Sartre’s case. Accordingly Fanon observes, in Masks, that 
the “native’s” consciousness of himself before the white man becomes an alienated 
consciousness; it, as he puts it, becomes a “third-person consciousness” (Fanon 
1986:110). “And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An 
unfamiliar weight burdened me”. (1986:110). We can say here that he becomes burdened 
because the burdensome “unfamiliar weight” of the white man imposes itself on him and 
permeates his entire being. This is because the white man is synonymous with the entire 
colonial or power system that he represents. Thus the feeling of alienation by the 
colonized person is experienced through and within a power inflected context between 
the colonizer—a white man—and the colonized person. Because of this the glances of the 
“Other”, the white man, introduces a reifying feeling on the colonized. Fanon writes that: 
“the glances of the other fixed me there, in the sense in which a chemical solution is fixed 
by a dye” (1986:109). The notion of power is a crucial one in Fanon’s argument. As we 
have seen above it is also one that sets him apart from Sartre.  
While it is possible in Sartre’s case for the individual to re-orientate one-self to the 
objective world, and confront the look of the other, for Fanon this is impossible under 
colonial domination, which as we have said is a domination of one race by another. We 
must remember that in Sartre’s case alienation occurs between two self-consciousnesses 
regardless of race. As such it is not impacted upon by a system of power. Within the 
colonial system, on the other hand, a system of power and domination ensures the 
obedience of the colonized subject. It is therefore highly unlikely that the settler would be 
unsettled or alienated by the gaze of the “native”, who he has enslaved anyway. For this 
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white man” (1986:110). And the converse is false (Fanon 1986110). In fact, the looking 
back by the colonized subject may even be seen by the coloniser as an act of 
insubordination, an act which could lead to serious disciplinary problems for the former. 
Thus Fanon’s cry that “All this whiteness that burns me…” (1986:114) is symptomatic of 
the white gaze syndrome which is embedded on the white power structure of colonialsm.  
Having observed Fanon’s understanding of black alienation, this leads us to the question: 
how then does Fanon conceptualise the disalienation of the black? This brings our 
discussion to Fanon’s theorisation of liberation.   
1.3 Liberation: Violence as a Mode of Recovering the Black Self 
Insofar as Fanon’s proposal for violent methods is concerned there seems to be tension 
between Fanon’s double roles as both a revolutionary as well as a humanist. In his book A 
critique of revolutionary humanism: Frantz Fanon, Richard Onwuanibe notes that Fanon 
combines the revolutionary element with humanism and describes Fanon as a revolutionary 
humanist. Having noted the deleterious impact of colonial violence on the dignity of the 
“natives” Fanon argued that counter violence by the “natives” was the starting point 
towards restoring the dignity of black self. In the chapter “Concerning Violence” in the 
Wretched Fanon invokes violence not only for the purpose of removing the colonial regime 
but also for its therapeutic impact on the colonized. Since Fanon conceives of colonialism as 
alienation he therefore argues that a violent catharsis by the colonized would help heal the 
wounds of colonialism. He says that “At a level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It 
frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction, it…restores 
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scheme of things, however, Fanon proposed a political solution that would make possible 
for a healthy living for the colonized people. More on this in the third chapter. 
Accordingly for Fanon violence operates at two interrelated levels: first at an individual 
level, secondly at a social level. At an individual level violence enables the individual to 
regain his confidence. It acts as a balancing mechanism to the violence of the coloniser. At a 
social level violence achieves to “explode(s) the old colonial truths” (Fanon 1967:117) and 
helps bring about a new social order or what Fanon sometimes call “radical mutations”. 
Both individually and at a social level the “natives”, through violence, create history as they 
rise against their colonial masters whilst at the same time claiming their humanity. As Fanon 
puts it: “the thing which has been colonized, becomes man in the process of freeing itself” 
(1967:28). Using the biblical words Fanon says that “The last shall be first and the first last” 
but this should come about through a “murderous and decisive struggle between the two 
protagonists” (1963:28), meaning between the colonizer and colonised.  
In the Wretched, decolonisation, we are told, is a project of “complete disorder” (Fanon 
1963:27). Decolonization works to bring about a new humanity or what Fanon calls a “new 
man” (1967:36). However in the initial stage the “native’s” counter violence appears as an 
irrational moment: it is at this stage not aimed at establishing a universal humanity. It is 
simply what Samira Kawash calls “violence of reversal” (1999:241). In Fanon’s own words 
“The native’s challenge…is not a rational confrontation of points of view…not a treatise on 
the universal…but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute” 
(1967:31). It is also what he also calls the “replacing of certain ‘species’ of men by another 
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But through violence the “natives” begin a journey of self-recovery and self-understanding 
towards the realization of their humanity. If colonialism had sowed the seeds of fear, 
despair and helplessness, in short alienation, violence comes to the “natives” as a sort of 
therapy. By striking a blow onto the colonizer, the “native” comes to realize that the settler, 
in fact, is no different to himself: he has the same red blood as he and that his white skin 
does not have any intrinsic value (Fanon 1967:35). Such realizations are revolutionary 
breakthroughs in the collective consciousness of the “natives”: they open up new avenues 
and new possibilities. If it is the settler who has brought the “native” into existence, who 
also perpetuates his existence as Fanon insists, then the violence of decolonization brings to 
an end not only the colonial concept of “natives” but the colonizer as well. Thus the 
destruction of colonialism and by implication, colonizer is necessarily the destruction of the 
colonized man for the two exists as opposites within the colonial system as Samira Kawash 
(1999:242) has observed. 
I have alluded to the fact that although Fanon conceives of violence as an instrument for 
social transformation, he also saw it as a form of psychological therapy. This latter aspect 
sets Fanon apart from the parochial view of violence as conceived by the nationalist 
movements. The nationalist’s view is parochial in the sense that they conceived of violence 
as instrumental only in toppling the colonial regimes. This, in itself, was reinforced by their 
idea of seeing freedom as political independence and therefore formal. Little, if any, 
attention was placed on the alienating effects of colonialism on the colonized people. 
Through his training as a psychiatrist combined with his political activism, Fanon sought to 
combine the psychological with the political in bringing to life a complete human being.  
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While Fanon endorses violence as a mode of recovering the black self, he is quick to caution 
that while spontaneous violence is necessary, it however needs to be controlled and 
brought in line with the revolutionary ideals of the anti-colonial movement. Otherwise it 
invariably leads to defeat. The chapter “Spontaneity: Its Strength and Weakness” in the 
Wretched, demonstrates Fanon’s concerns about misguided violence against the colonizer. 
He warns that “Racialism and hatred and resentment – ‘a legitimate desire for revenge’ – 
cannot sustain a war of liberation” (Fanon 1967:110). Thus violence needs to be qualified by 
politically educating the masses so that they are made to understand its political importance 
in relation to the revolutionary struggle.  
Fanon argued that violence should be brief and to precise extent that it achieves its desired 
objectives. He points out that the war should be ended “not because there are no more 
enemies left to kill” (1967:113), but because the enemy has come to realize that its interests 
lies “in recognizing the sovereignty of the colonized people” (Fanon 1967:113). This is 
because the colonizer is not interested in a protracted war that depletes his resources, but 
to aims to profit from the colonial conquest. 
Echoing Fanon, Gail Presbey stresses the importance of knowledge in the exercise of 
violence. Understanding the importance of knowledge in action Presbey is aware of the 
dangers that may arise if things are not explained to the masses. She maintains that “The 
immediacy of ‘muscles’ is a mirage; knowledge is needed” (Presbey 1996:292). Her 
metaphors on the violence of the colonized as analogous to surgery are important; in 
reference to Fanon she says that “Just as successful surgery is brief, and not a way of 
life,…revolutionary violence ought to be brief” (See Presbey 1996:292). From this it is clear 
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violence as an instrument to bring about a higher humanity makes it difficult to categorize 
Fanon either as either an apostle of violence or as a pacifist. In any case perhaps that is what 
makes him a mysterious figure.  
1.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter I undertook to examine Fanon’s analysis and understanding of and the 
rationale of colonialism together with its impact on the colonized people. It emerged that 
while colonialism created artificial and race based hierarchies of superiority and inferiority 
complexes between the blacks and whites, it simultaneously established dependency 
relations between the colonizing power and the colonized country. Motivated by the 
material interests of the colonizing western nations this relation brought the raw materials 
based in the colonies within the grasp of the global capitalist system. As we saw Fanon was 
not merely concerned with detailing the economic and psychological alienation of the 
colonial encounter but more with finding solutions for the black man’s alienation. 
To this end Fanon recognized that the black man’s disalienation would come about not 
through the coloniser’s benevolence or concessions but through his own efforts and actions 
grounded in knowledge. Knowledge is imparted though the dialectical interplay between 
the leaders and the masses within the dialectic of the organization of the anti-colonial 
movement. In regards to action, violence plays an important part towards achieving the self-
understanding of the people, it awakens the colonized peoples’ consciousness in relation to 
the liberation struggle. Controlled violence is in line with Fanon’s argument that it is through 
self-control and self-action that liberation could be obtained. As in Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic Fanon’s insistence on violence shows that genuine liberation will not be handed 











29 | P a g e  
 
Unfortunately Fanon did not live to see a truly liberated African country in the manner that 
he had hoped for. Instead the parochial conception of liberation as the flag and the 
presidential palace, advanced by the nationalist leaders—advised by “experts” in the former 
colonial power coupled by the continuing relations of dependency between the colony and 
the former colonial power—have undermined the sovereignty and independence of the 
post-colonial state in Africa. This view of liberation has seen the post-independence State 
sinking into neo-colonialist practices, enthusiastically facilitated by the national bourgeoisie. 
Thus in the next chapter I will examine Fanon’s critique of the failures of the post-liberation 
state which he regards as a falsely conceived form of liberation. The critique will show 
Fanon as departing from the line of national liberation movements which had as their idea 
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Chapter 2: False Forms of Liberation  
Now, the ordinary native interprets these unfair promotions as many acts of sabotage, and 
he is often heard to declare: ‘It wasn’t worth while, then, our becoming independent…’ 
          Frantz Fanon 
If, as argued in the previous chapter, that Fanon’s critique of colonialism is distinctive 
because of the emphasis that he places on alienation, then this will have implications for his 
conception of liberation. However his conception of liberation is developed against an 
existing conception held by nationalist movements. But what we need to do is ask the 
question: in what way is the nationalist movement’s conception of liberation misleading? 
The liberation movement’s conception of liberation was, in the first place, narrow. It was 
narrow, in that, it conceived of liberation politically as independence. This conception of 
liberation was problematic, in that, it failed to take into account the deeper underlying 
nature of colonial relations between the colonizing power and the colony. Since this 
conception of liberation leaves unchanged the colonial structures that benefit imperialism, 
it only manages to reinforce the old colonial relations under the guise of national 
independence. It therefore creates a problem of a false sense of liberation. False because, 
although it manages to get rid of the colonial regime, it leaves intact the old colonial 
structures of oppression. With this in mind I will argue that Fanon’s analysis do not only 
provide an understanding of post-independence state failures but can also help in 
understanding the social and political problems of our own contemporary societies in Africa. 
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chapters “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness” and “On National Culture” of The 
Wretched of the Earth.  
The Wretched of the Earth was written in 1961, when only a handful of countries had 
secured independence in Africa, more than thirty years before South Africa finally became a 
democracy. Although we have now entered the second decade of the 21st century, Fanon’s 
insights, in this book, have proved relevant for our own contemporary society plagued by 
ubiquitous corruption, bureaucracy, materialism and general political degeneration.  
Fanon’s analysis show that the responsibility for the downward spiral of the nation state 
originates from the covert behaviour of the national bourgeoisie to secure economic gains, 
which it secures at the detriment of the whole nation. Its behavior is, however, closely 
linked to the influence of imperialist forces in the West. The economic links between the 
national bourgeoisie and the imperialist nations ensured a continued imbalance between 
the newly independent African states and the former colonial powers within the global 
economy. Thus in this chapter, I set out to examine the behavior of the nationalist 
bourgeoisie against the objectives of the national liberation movement. My objective is to 
answer the following question: how has the behaviour of the national bourgeoisie led to the 
creation of a false sense of liberation? This question will be examined insofar as the 
activities of the national bourgeoisie hinges on other political actors such as the national 
parties and the “native” intellectuals.   
2.1 The National Bourgeoisie 
In order to understand the basic character of false liberation we need to focus on the role 
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colonial civil service. It therefore consists of the “native” elites who constitute the local 
agents of the colonial system. At the proclamation of independence, the national 
bourgeosie moves to take over positions which are a legacy of colonialism. Its economic 
ambitions have, since independence, continued to undermine and compromise 
development within the nation state.  
Unlike the settler bourgeoisie of the former colonial power, which the local bourgeoisie 
seeks to replace, the latter is characterized by a weak economic position. Its economic 
weakness is tied to the historical relations with the former colonizing power which has 
prevented it from playing a decisive role of creating material prosperity in society. The 
“native” bourgeoisie does not own any means of production: it exists as an appendage of 
the mother country bourgeoisie. Largely influenced by European ideas, it has a mimetic 
desire to enjoy the same privileges as the former colonial bourgeoisie. “We have seen that 
the native never ceases to dream of putting himself in the place of the settler – not of 
becoming the settler but of substituting himself for the settler” (Fanon 1967:41). Thus the 
national bourgeoisie seeks to enjoy the same economic privileges as the colonizer.  
Fanon makes it clear that the nationalist bourgeoisie in the former colonies is characterized 
by a state of dependency. This is because the national bourgeoisie defines itself 
compradorially as intermediaries between the local economy and the metropolis, that is, as 
the “transmission line between the nation and capitalism” that “today puts on the masque 
of neo-colonialism” (1967:122). Among Fanon’s concerns with the nationalist bourgeoisie is 
not only the fact that this class is incapable of harmonizing social relations, nor that it fails to 
invest in the national economy, but also concerns the moral demise that has come to 
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as a sort of “greedy caste”, “avid and voracious, with a mind of a huckster” content to 
receive dividends that the coloniser hands out to it (Fanon 1967:141). 
It is important to point out here that while Fanon makes use of the Marxist concepts such as 
“the bourgeoisie”, “the proletariat” etc. to the colonial context, that Fanon was, in fact, not 
an orthodox Marxist. However it is clear that Fanon, like Marx, understood that the 
alienation of “natives” was the result of modern industrial capitalism.  
Racism belongs to the shameless exploitation of one group of men by 
another which has reached a higher stage of technical development.... The 
habit of considering racism as a mental quirk, as a psychological flaw, must 
be abandoned (1967: 38).  
 Although this passage exhibits Fanon’s Marxist leanings, what Fanon also does is to 
superimpose race onto Marx’s theory of labour alienation. In doing so Fanon is aware of the 
divergent economic conditions that exists in colonized countries vis-à-vis the industrial 
countries, particularly England within which Karl Marx wrote Capital and France which 
Fanon witnessed for himself.   
In England industrialization had managed to create an elite class of individuals who had 
accumulated massive capital. Marx called this class the bourgeoisie. With it, industrialization 
also created a large pool of workers who sold their labour in the labour market for 
sustenance. Marx called this pool the proletariat or the working class. In the colonial 
countries, on the other hand, since colonialism did not build industry in the same scale as it 
did in Europe, there could not, therefore, have emerged a bourgeoisie in the same scale as 
in the industrialized countries; nor a working class. That is because these countries 
remained largely underdeveloped and dependent on the export of raw materials. 
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metropolis Fanon, in The Wretched of the Earth, makes reference to four main “classes”: the 
national bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the lumpen-proletariat and the peasantry. But unlike 
Marx who placed revolutionary agency within the proletariat, Fanon placed this role on the 
peasantry and the lumpen-proletariat. This was inevitable in that the former colonized 
countries consisted largely of the peasant population. And since industrialization did not 
take place in the colonized countries as it did in Europe, there could not have developed 
here a bourgeoisie with the same economic strength as in the West. 
Fanon’s introduction of race as underlying colonial exploitation of the “natives” by European 
imperialist nations demonstrates his originality within the Marxist tradition. Marxist theory 
is not necessarily concerned with issues of race but more with relations of production 
between the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production) and the proletariat. In 
the Communist Manifesto, for example, Marx and Engels point out that the history of the 
struggles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in the West, centers around the 
exploitation of the latter by the former. In the colonies, on the other hand, as Fanon points 
out, race is central to the production of labour. Here the ruling elite can also be 
distinguished by their skin colour. Accordingly those that constitute the middle class would 
be white and European, and the oppressed, black, African, Arab, Asian etc. Thus more often 
than not, in the colonial countries conflict tends to assume a racial dimension than say in 
the virtually, racially homogenous nations of the West.  
However in the Wretched Fanon perceives the disjuncture between the national bourgeoisie 
and the people as being marred by the former’s commercial interests which it seeks to 
secure at all cost. In the aftermath of independence the national middle class is convinced 
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the former settler bourgeoisie (Fanon 1967:120). Lacking the necessary resources that could 
give it economic clout the national bourgeoisie cannot realistically assume the role of 
captains of industry. Thus the nationalist bourgeoisie, because it is itself underdeveloped, 
cannot in reality replace the settler bourgeoisie. Fanon notes that it is at the realization of 
this incapacity, at the dawn of independence, that the national bourgeoisie sends out 
“frenzied appeals” for help to the former colonizer (Fanon 1967:120). From the onset the 
national bourgeoisie is relegated into intermediary type of activities. It will therefore ensure 
that all transactions between the local economy and the multi-national companies pass 
through its hands.   
He notes that during the last days of colonialism the nationalist leaders occupy a strategic 
position as “go-betweens” between the colonized people and the retreating colonialism.  
According to Fanon this affords them with an opportunity to negotiate favourable 
conditions for the people in the future state. But during this critical period of political 
transition the bourgeoisie commits treason. They commit treason, in that, they allow 
themselves to be corrupted by the forces of imperialism which presents them with 
irresistible opportunities to put their own personal economic interests at the expense of the 
whole nation.  
Contrary to the behavior of the national bourgeoisie Fanon proposes that this class abandon 
its class narcissism and join forces with the masses in their quest for freedom. The 
implication for this proposal is that the national bourgeoisie ought to stifle its nature as a 
bourgeois class and free itself from the shackles of capitalism. He says that  
Now, precisely, it would seem that the historical vocation of an authentic 
middle class in an under-developed country is to repudiate its own nature 
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capitalism, and make itself the willing slave of that revolutionary capital 
which is the people (1967:120). 
 He further says the national bourgeoisie 
ought to consider as its bounden duty to betray the calling fate has marked 
out for it, and to put itself to school with the people… (1967:120).  
Although this is the most important feature in Fanon’s critique of the national bourgeoisie’s 
behavior, it is not argued for in any detail. It is not clear for instance as to what Fanon 
proposes as the alternative to the national bourgeoisie and how it could become the 
“willing slaves” of the revolution. Nevertheless Fanon’s proposal is based on the conviction 
that the national bourgeoisie does have the freedom to extricate itself from being the tool 
of capitalism and to become part of the revolution.  I argue that his conception of freedom 
is broadly affected by Sartrean existentialist philosophy. 
In Sartre’s philosophy, consciousness is decisive towards the realization of freedom. For 
Sartre consciousness confronts reality freely, that is, without essence. His conception of 
freedom is based on the view that “existence precedes essence” or that human subjectivity 
as opposed to mechanical forces, is the starting point (Sartre 1947:15). It therefore suggests 
the freedom of consciousness. It means that although an individual may find himself 
subjected to external power or control, self-consciousness is itself always free. Hence self-
consciousness, for Sartre as it is for Fanon, is the starting point towards the realization of 
one’s freedom. Thus since self-consciousness is free, this opens up possibilities from which 
freedom of the body can be realised. It is in this sense also that Fanon conceives of freedom. 
Against the objectification of man, in Masks Fanon says that:  
All I wanted was to be a man among other man. I wanted to come lithe and 
young into a world that was ours and to help build it together. But I 
rejected all immunization of the emotions. I wanted to be a man, nothing 
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In relation to the conduct of the national bourgeoisie, we can conclude therefore that Fanon 
wants them to take ownership of the responsibility for their actions. This means that they 
ought not to allow their actions and the destinies of their countries to be determined 
elsewhere other than within their own countries.  
Fanon endorses Sartre’s thesis that every man is fully responsible for what he and what he 
chooses for himself, and that as each chooses for himself he also chooses for others. This 
means that each is responsible not only for his individual actions but also for human kind as 
a whole. That means that any of our individual acts has a moral implication on the behavior 
of others. He argues that “in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one 
of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to 
be” (Sartre 1945:20). That is because Sartre assumes that in choosing a course of action, 
man always chooses that which is good over evil. For that which is good for us is good for all 
(1945:20). This view of freedom, tied to responsibility impacts on Fanon’s thinking about 
what ought to be the behavior of the “native” bourgeoisie in this instance. That although 
imperialism militates against them in various ways, ultimately their destiny depends on 
them. 
It is in this sense that Fanon believes that the elite position occupied by the “native” 
bourgeoisie in the former colonies puts them in a unique position to act in ways that could 
change the lives of masses. There is no excuse for them to think that they are somehow 
immune from the duty to act outside of responsibility. Just like the rest of humanity, they 
cannot escape the feeling of anguish that comes with an act of responsibility. According to 
Sartre one cannot, for instance, shrug their shoulders in the belief that their individual 











38 | P a g e  
 
Sartre asks the Following question: what would happen if everybody looked at things in an 
individualistic way without taking into account the impact on the whole of humanity? From 
this he concludes that there cannot be an escaping of responsibility, unless one does so out 
of dishonesty, as a form of bad faith.  
Fanon does not treat the notion of freedom systematically and as a separate theme as 
Sartre does. But it is without doubt that his conception of freedom has remnants of Sartrean 
existential philosophy, sketches of which are found in both Black Skin, White Masks and The 
Wretched of the Earth as mentioned earlier. In Masks, particularly in the chapter “The Fact 
of Blackness” the notion of responsibility for one’s freedom runs through that entire 
chapter. There Fanon urges the black man to rise above racism and claim his own destiny. 
He says that “since it was impossible for me to get away from an inborn complex, to assert 
myself as a BLACK MAN. Since the other hesitated to recognize me, there remained only one 
solution: to make myself known” (Fanon 1986:115). Thus for Fanon, freedom is tied to self-
assertion. In the Wretched,  Fanon’s invocation of violence in response to the violence of the 
colonizer together with his call for the national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals to join 
forces with the masses in revolt, are some of the indications of Fanon’s awareness of this 
notion of freedom tied to responsibility.    
 So any form of oppression or bondage is according to Fanon a temporary state leading 
towards freedom. But since the bourgeoisie has allowed itself to be swept away by the 
global currency of capitalism, its conduct can be interpreted as an act of inauthenticity: a 
refusal to honour its responsibility. This situation, of course, undermines the efforts that the 
national liberation movement has made in removing colonialism and makes a mockery of 
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During the period of political transition the middle class reneges on the people’s hopes and 
dreams for genuine liberation. It does so by adopting an indifferent attitude towards the 
plight of the nation. It appears that its class conservatism has made it intransigent in so far 
as the material and spiritual needs of the nation are concerned. For this reason Fanon 
proposes, as we have noted above, that this national bourgeoisie commit class suicide. 
Although it is not clear how the national bourgeoisie should assist the revolution, Fanon 
insists that it is pointless to disengage them in regards to the demands of the revolutionary 
struggle. He points out that it ought to put at the people’s disposal the intellectual and 
technical capital that it has gained whilst training at colonial universities. But unfortunately 
for Fanon this is not the path that the bourgeoisie chooses. As we have noted earlier, it 
takes the only easy way out of the situation; that is, it chooses to profit from the economic 
situation that colonialism has created. This is candidly captured by Fanon when he writes 
that: 
But unhappily we shall see that very often the national middle class does 
not follow this heroic, positive, fruitful and just path; rather, it disappears 
with the soul set at peace into the shocking ways – shocking because anti-
national – of a traditional bourgeoisie, a bourgeoisie which is stupidly, 
contemptibly, cynical bourgeoisie (1986:120-121). 
It is clear that Fanon wants the national bourgeoisie to cross-over and join the ranks of the 
people. Fanon does not only want certain individuals with this class to join the revolution 
but the whole bourgeoisie class.  
The idea of class suicide was also used by Amilcar Cabral and Karl Marx. Marx, for example, 
observed that during the proletarian revolution, certain members of the ruling class, cross-
over to join the revolutionary class. For Karl Marx it is during the period of instability, at the 
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the ruling class cuts itself adrift to join the proletarian class (Marx and Engels 1967:91). For 
Marx and Engels this process of dissolution within the ruling class, in effect the dissolution 
within the whole society, is precipitated by a period of tumult and violence which detaches 
some members of the ruling class to join the proletarian revolution. Unlike Fanon, for Marx 
it is certain individuals within the ruling class that cross-over to join the revolutionary class 
whereas Fanon wants the whole “native” bourgeois class to dissolve. For Fanon this class 
must dissolve because it lacks economic power. This is evident when Fanon writes that “that 
section of the nation which annexes for its own profit all the wealth of the country” 
(1986:134) – insofar as it is bourgeois, must be completely rejected. He says that it “must be 
stoutly opposed” not only because it slows down the growth of the national economy but 
because it is “good for nothing” (1986:141).   
According to Marx and Engels the bourgeoisie’s cross-over does not occur in a theoretical 
vacuum, but occurs as the outcome of an understanding of the movement of history. They 
are of the view that this “portion of bourgeois ideologist … have raised themselves to 
apprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole” (Marx & Engels 1967:91) 
and have therefore taken matters upon themselves to join the revolutionary class. 
According to the authors, only the proletariat is the true revolutionary class, the only “class 
which holds the future in its hands” (Marx & Engels 1967:91). This is because while the 
other classes decay before the capitalist mode of production, the proletariat, on the other 
hand, “is its special and essential product” (Marx & Engels 1967:91), and therefore the only 
class capable of transforming the oppressive relations that capitalism has introduced. 
Although Fanon adopts a similar view with Marx and Engels in so far as what the 
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agency is concerned. While the latter locate this role within the proletariat, Fanon locates 
agency chiefly within the peasantry. This renders Fanon’s approach dialectical—as opposed 
to imposing Marxist dogma—in that he locates revolutionary agency precisely from the 
peasant conditions reproduced by the colonial system.   
It is for this reason, contrary to some versions of Marxist theory that Fanon argues against 
the bourgeois phase in underdeveloped countries. In line with Marxist theory since 1917, 
Fanon bases his conclusion on his conviction that the bourgeoisie of underdeveloped 
countries can only justify itself insofar as it has sufficient economic and technical strength to 
build up a bourgeois society (Fanon 1986:140-141). Since the national bourgeoisie lacks the 
necessary economic power, Fanon says that the bourgeois phase in underdeveloped 
countries should be “skipped” (1967:140). He thus rejects the Marxian interpretation of 
history that sees history as following an a priori path towards communism of which the 
bourgeois phase is a necessary condition. Fanon wants the question of the bourgeoisie 
phase to be confronted from the context of the particular historical conditions of the 
revolution, not in objective thought. This is particularly prudent in that the economic 
conditions of underdeveloped countries, does not permit for the development of a large 
scale bourgeoisie in order to make it play its proper role. 
Fanon also notices that when these leaders are asked about the economic programme of 
the future state they are calling for, they are found unable to reply. This is because the 
economy has always developed beyond the limits of their grasp. Colonialism has ensured 
that the nationalist bourgeoisie remains ignorant of the economy. Thus, over and above 
economic weakness the bourgeoisie remains with only an abstract and approximate 
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is therefore highly circumscribed. In order to continue profiting while the national economy 
stagnates, it uses its strong influence in government and other sectors to continue 
plundering the national resources.   
Fanon observes that in some of the newly independent nations democracy is compromised 
from the very beginning. Economically powerless and ideologically bankrupt, the 
bourgeoisie, made buoyant by its class dominance, chooses for itself what seems the easiest 
solution to politically organize the nation, it chooses the single party regime (1967:132). 
However, the single party regime is not intended to advance the interests of the whole 
nation but manages to centralize power. Thus the single party regime serves to consolidate 
power in the hands of the few. Fanon notes that taking into account its weak moral 
character, its lack of economic power as well as knowledge of state institutions, the national 
bourgeoisie will prove incapable of fulfilling even the barest essentials of state obligations; 
namely meeting the nation’s material needs, safeguarding it’s freedom and justice. In other 
words the bourgeois state fails to inspire confidence in the nation. On the contrary, the 
state, through its various functionaries, manages to instill a state of constant fear in the 
minds of the people. For these reasons Fanon concludes that “The single party [regime] is 
the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, 
unscrupulous and cynical” (1986:132). However this is not the end of the story; for the roots 
of political degeneration run deep and wide. 
In the first analysis we learn that the nationalist bourgeoisie comes into power on the basis 
of a narrow nationalism. This nationalism is underpinned by its desire to rid the country of 
European colonisation. On its own there is nothing wrong with ridding the country of the 
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program is to “nationalize” or “Africanise” not only the state but the economy as well. But 
we observe that such clamoring for nationalization is not intended to bring the various men 
and women together into harmony, but to exclude them.  As Fanon puts it: “To them, 
nationalization quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages 
which are a legacy of the colonial period” (1967:122).  He observes that the nationalist 
bourgeoisie will not stop until it has taken over everything.  
In order to entrench its grip on power and the economy Fanon notes that the national 
bourgeoisie makes use of sectoral divisions within the country. He notes that the narrow 
nationalism of the national bourgeoisie becomes tinged not only by tribal fanaticism but 
also with religious and national chauvinism. Accordingly the economic and social ills of the 
country will be represented to the masses of the people, by their leaders, as stemming from 
the presence of foreign nationals in the country who, as  Fanon puts it, “hamper them in 
commercial matters or in administrative posts” (1967:126). He says that “If the Europeans 
get in the way of the intellectuals and the business bourgeoisie of the young nation, for the 
mass of the population in the towns competition is represented principally by Africans of 
another nation” (1967:126). He observes that this tendency from the national bourgeoisie 
arises out of the anxiety to place in its hands “the power held hitherto by the foreigner…” 
(1967:126). The masses of the people therefore also present similar demands as the 
bourgeoisie. But Fanon notes that these are confined within certain territorial limits (Fanon 
1967:126). 
Fanon notes that tribal attitudes tend to emerge whenever the bourgeoisie has failed to 
harmonise social relations and to extend its vision of the world sufficiently to the people 
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neglected others, federalism quickly gathers momentum and triumphs. In certain countries 
of “Black Africa”, Fanon observes that members of parliament, sometimes even ministers, 
will not shy away from pointing out that the nation’s danger is no longer presented by 
reoccupation by European colonialism for instance, but by an “eventual invasion by those 
vandals of Arabs coming from the North’” (1967:131). Not knowing any better, the people 
rally behind their leaders in expelling foreigners. 
This section on the behavior of the national bourgeoisie highlights some of the causes of the 
regression of the nation state in Africa. In their pursuit of economic gains and power they 
bring about the degeneration of national consciousness and undermine the development of 
the nation state. It also shows that in pursuing its economic objectives the national 
bourgeoisie works in tandem with the nationalist leaders and the parties. Thus in the 
following section we will examine how the political party functions as an instrument of the 
bourgeoisie within the nation-state.   
2.2 The Political Party  
The political party forms a critical place in Fanon’s analysis of political degeneration. 
According to Fanon prior to independence the party functions as a platform for the free flow 
of ideas from the party level right up to the level of government. But with the arrival of 
independence certain elements within the bourgeoisie vie to intercept this democratic 
process. They move to wield power and influence from within the party machine, and in the 
process bar the “upward thrust” (Fanon 1967:32) of the people’s democratic will. This 
creates a situation whereby the party becomes an implement of the hands of the national 
bourgeosie. As Fanon puts it “Objectively, sometimes subjectively” (1967:138) the party 











45 | P a g e  
 
nationalist bourgeoisie will convince the nationalist leaders that for economic development 
to take place in an underdeveloped country, an authoritarian form of government is a 
necessity (Fanon 1967:146).  
The national bourgeoisie, through the party and the government, “ensures that the people 
are hemmed in and immobilised” (Fanon 1967:138). As an extension of the government, the 
party helps the government to immobilise the people. By working through the party and the 
government, the national bourgeoisie gives the impression that it wants to work with the 
people. But its objectives, insofar as it is the tool of capitalism, shows that it, in fact, intends 
to work against them. This is because the bourgeoisie has economic interests which it does 
not share with the rest of the population. Ultimately it’s bewildering behaviour, not only 
does it disenfranchise the people, but robs them of the opportunity to actively engage in the 
process of nation building. 
In order to avoid this Fanon argues that the mingling of the political party with government 
ought to be avoided. The question that follows from this is that: how then does Fanon 
conceives of the separation of the party and the government? In the first instance Fanon 
notes that the party ought to be an instrument in the service of the people where the 
people themselves decide policies for the government (1967:149). But in order to bring 
about this outcome Fanon proposes that the party has to cease being the domain of the 
elites whereby government bigwigs and some regime dignitaries may have separate 
meetings in the capital. Contrary to this Fanon urges that: “The party should be 
decentralized to the extreme” (1967:149). This means that political activity should be 
decentralized to the remote parts of the country where the majority of people live. The 
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to leave the capital and settle in the countryside. “The leading members of the party ought 
to avoid the capital as if it had the plague” says Fanon (1967:149). It is only through such 
decentralization that the masses could have a chance at a meaningful participation in 
building their own nation and that the neglected regions of the country could be brought to 
life. 
The separation of the party and the government is for Fanon crucial in achieving these 
political objectives. Thus the party ought to play its role in heightening the consciousness of 
the people. For Fanon this is a political imperative for which national progress is embedded. 
“The party is not an administration responsible for transmitting government orders” (Fanon 
1967:151). On the contrary the party ought to be the “direct expression of the masses” 
(Fanon 1967:151). Moreover the party ought to be an organism through which the people 
themselves exercise their authority in freely expressing their will. For Fanon this has an 
added advantage of preventing covert elements within the party from using it as the ladder 
towards achieving private ends. 
But instead of embracing the expression of popular discontent as Fanon observes, the party 
forms a screen between itself and the people and shuts the channels of communication. In 
Algeria, for instance, the FLN divided the movement into two categories: the party and the 
people. The former would do work for the latter (Prashad 2007:123). Instead of 
decentralising the party, the leaders ensured that decision making was centralized. Instead 
of promoting national unity and awakening the consciousness of the whole nation, party 
leaders, worked to suppress it. As Fanon had noted, these events are superseded by a 
descendance into pre-colonial tribal attitudes. Through tribal factionalism, the leaders 
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that government ministers, ambassadors are all chosen from the same tribe as the 
president. The tribe will profess to represent the whole nation. Obviously these actions are 
not without enormous political ramifications. As Fanon observes such actions bring rise to 
ethnic and regional sentiments within the nation state. Certain regions, particularly those 
rich in mineral deposits become more inclined towards detaching from the rest of the 
country. For example in the Congo Kasavubu proclaimed self-governance for the mineral 
rich Katanga region while in Nigeria Ojukwe proclaimed independence of the oil rich state of 
Biafra.  
The underlying causes of political degeneration here can be premised on the bourgeois idea 
that the masses are incapable of governing themselves. The rise of authoritarianism can be 
seen as intertwined with this very idea of seeing the masses as a blind and incoherent force. 
Fanon made it his task to show this idea as based on false assumptions. More succinctly it 
shows the ruling elite’s objectives of governing the nation-state without the interference of 
the people. In Algeria, the FLN was quite conspicuous for its stance against the broader 
political participation of the masses within a multi-party political system. The 1963 
Constitution declared Algeria a one-party state ruled by the FLN. Ahmed Ben Bella, later 
president of Algeria, favoured the creation of an elite party, while his political rival 
Mohammed Khider (who was later assassinated in Spain in 1967), opted for an inclusive 
party. After independence was proclaimed, the FLN moved to demobilize the Algerian 
people and put paid to all the hopes for radical social democracy which had been envisaged 
in the 1964 Charter of Algiers.  
The 1963 Constitution of Algeria, promulgated two years after Fanon’s death, is testimony 
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parties, parties that had been involved in the anti-colonial activism prior to independence, 
except the FLN, would be abolished. It further elevated the president—whom at the time 
was Ben Bella—to the sole formulator of state policy (Prashad 2007:123). Instead of heeding 
Fanon’s cautious advice, the FLN bestowed the energy of the Algerian Revolution onto a 
single man. In another attempt to abolish the multi-party system, the FLN advanced the 
view that the existence of a number of political parties frustrates the national interest, in 
that, it allows for the articulation of particular interests to organize into different pressure 
groups. To this end the FLN pronounced that there should only be one party that would be 
able to organize existing interests into a coherent whole (Prashad 2007:123). The argument 
put forward was that this strategy will enhance democracy and national cohesion, in that, 
democracy would now take place within this single party, the FLN.  
As the ensuing events showed this was mere political rhetoric on the part of the leaders, 
never to materialize into anything substantive. For instance, the FLN swiftly moved to crack 
down on its political rivals. Of these included the Communist Party of Algeria and the Parti 
de la Revolution Socialiste which were at some point in line with the leftist agenda of the 
FLN during the days of struggle, as Prashad points out. My dwelling on the Algerian 
experience is not intended to characterize the Algerian exception but to highlight a trend 
that was gaining momentum among the nation states that were being born in the 1960s. 
The demobilization of the masses raises some questions on the nation state’s approach to 
development. It appears as though the ruling elites had no ambiguities about the direction 
the state should take with regards to development. In Algeria, as was the case elsewhere in 
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if any attention was given to bringing the diverse opinions of the people on board, people 
who had been instrumental in bringing the national liberation movement into power.  
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the bureaucratic state in Africa failed to 
enlighten the masses, to make them realize that public business is, in fact, the business of 
the people. According to Fanon enlightenment of the masses entails an ongoing process of 
politically conscientising them. It entails making people aware that everything depends on 
them; that if the nation moves forward, it is due to them; that if the nation stagnates, it is 
because of them too (1967:159). To achieve this stage of political consciousness requires 
national self-understanding. Fanon places the responsibility for this function in the hands of 
the leaders. Party leaders therefore, ought to open the people’s minds, and to allow for the 
birth of the people’s intelligence. Quoting Césaire, Fanon argues that political education 
means “to invent souls” (1967:159). Political education entails bringing about what Fanon 
calls a “new man”. 
 So we can see here that for Fanon political education cannot be a temporary thing, or be 
reduced to a single event as when the party gathers scores of people for a rally in the period 
nearing the elections. But against such superficiality, Fanon says that “we often believe with 
criminal superficiality that to educate the masses politically means a long political harangue 
from time to time. We think that it is enough for the leader or one of his lieutenants should 
speak in a pompous tone about the principle events of the day for them to have fulfilled this 
bounden duty to educate the masses politically” (1967:159). From this we can see that there 
cannot be quick-fix solutions to political education.  
As proof of the success of political education, Fanon relies on Algeria as a case in point. He 
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can understand, that the people are, in fact, quick to grab on. But if you use difficult 
concepts understood by university graduates then it can easily be proved that the masses 
need to be managed from above (1967:152). He notes that if a considerable period of time 
is taken in explaining to people, the time lost in explaining is recovered in the actual 
execution of the plan. The most important thing is that “People must know where they are 
going, and why” (1967:156) says Fanon. He insists that the future remains bleak as long as 
the consciousness of the masses remains rudimentary.  
Fanon thus urges African politicians to have clear ideas about the situation of their people. 
But this clarity, notes Fanon, “must be profoundly dialectical” (1967:156). By dialectical 
Fanon means the awakening of the people’s consciousness through the interplay between 
them and the politicians in order to improve their conditions. The relation between the 
masses and the politicians must be dialectical in the sense that social transformation and 
progress must be the outcome of the heightened level of consciousness from the masses. In 
this regard Fanon uses the example of building a bridge. He says that: “If the building of the 
bridge does not enrich the awareness of those who work on it, than that bridge ought not to 
be built…The bridge should not be ‘parachuted down’ from above” (Fanon 1967:162). On 
the contrary it should emerge as the result of the people’s own efforts. It is only thus that 
for Fanon the people can come to an understanding of themselves and appreciate their 
freedom.   
It is clear that Fanon rejects the tendency to instill unquestioned reverence of the party on 
the masses by their leaders. For Fanon the only sacred principle that ought to be promoted 
is that of respect for human dignity and recognition. This principle, for Fanon, entails the 
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ought to be created by the political party. Accordingly Fanon remarks that respect for this 
principle, and not some abstract formalism, is the only guarantee to salvation. This brings 
our discussion to the role of intellectuals.  
2.3 The Native Intellectuals 
The project of national consciousness is rendered almost impossible without the 
involvement of intellectuals. Fanon attached tremendous importance to the role played by 
intellectuals in relation to the anti-colonial movement.  Within the organization of the 
revolutionary movement it happens at times that party militants and leaders, talk, for 
whatever considerations, in an impassioned tone but without imparting new knowledge to 
the masses. This mystifying behavior has the danger of creating a culture of passivity. For 
this reason the function of intellectual elaboration is for Fanon, rendered indispensable. The 
role of intellectuals is rendered indispensable in that they are able to give intellectual 
elaboration where others can’t or have chosen to overlook this imperative. Thus the 
intellectual’s involvement in the liberation movement ensures that the dangers of 
intellectual stagnation or regression are minimised and that the nation marches forward in 
an enlightened fashion.  
For Fanon the intellectual’s role can best be understood within the context of the 
organization. Fanon had a particular understanding of the “organization”. He understands it 
in epistemic terms as a framework for “intellectual communication and exchange…as 
responses people draw on as they reflect on their revolutionary experience” (Gibson 
1999:7). Accordingly Fanon sees the rise in the people’s level of consciousness as brought 
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puts his intellectual resource in the service of the people; aiding them to reach their self-
understanding.  
In The Wretched of the Earth Fanon refers to two types of “native” intellectuals: the militant 
and conservative intellectuals. The former are more radical in their approach insofar the 
revolutionary struggle against colonialism is concerned. The latter are conservative in that 
they adopt a disengaged or indifferent attitude towards the national struggle. The militant 
intellectual, on the other hand, is depicted as an agent of change who puts his intellectual 
expertise at the people’s disposal in their march towards national liberation. As such Fanon 
posits the militant intellectual (sometimes referred to as the radical intellectual) as an 
“element of the contradiction” who continually raises the contradictions of colonial life as 
knowledge toward action (Gibson 1999:3). Fanon argues that these contradictions help 
“explode the old colonial truths and reveals unexpected facets, which bring about new 
meanings and pinpoints the contradictions camouflaged by these facts” (Fanon 1967:117).  
As avatars of European values, the conservative intellectuals have been made to think in 
Manichean ways: for instance they dream of enjoying the same privileges as the 
beneficiaries of the colonial system do. But since the conservative intellectuals embody two 
identities: culturally Eurocentric while racially black, they find themselves in a moral 
dilemma. Within the Manichean and racially divided colonial society they find themselves 
alienated.  
Fanon observes that the conservative intellectuals—“cultured individuals of the colonized 
race” (1967:168)—at bottom seek to attach themselves to the people. But they go about 
this in the wrong way. They direct their endeavors to inventorying the cultural particulars of 
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colonial power and that they achieve nothing in dismantling the colonial system. Negritude 
was one such intellectual movement that sought to present a counter humanism to the 
pejorative stereotypes stemming from western humanism.  
The exponents of Negritude spoke an antithetical language to Western humanism and its 
racism. Because of the alienation and the pejorative stereotypes about blacks and their 
histories, Negritude viewed the past as the source and inspiration that ought to inform future 
endeavors in the fight for national liberation and against black alienation. They sought to 
discover the past achievements of black civilizations. In Fanon’s words they wanted to prove, or 
to “demonstrate that a Negro culture exists” (1967:167). And since colonialism had dismissed 
the entire black race as backward and savage, Negritude also adopted a universal standpoint, 
similar to colonialism, in addressing the problems of black oppression.  
Fanon had a distrust for both of these approaches. Through its backward cultural gaze and the 
adoption of a “universal standpoint” (Fanon 1967:170,173,176), Negritude ended up 
essentialising black experience. Fanon viewed the return to the past as irrational (1986:123) 
and as an ineffective weapon with which to base the movement as an antithesis to the 
deleterious effects of European humanism towards black people. He thought that the attempt 
to discover the pristine past of black civilizations and cultures or the “source” reinforces the 
stereotypes of blacks as savages, fraught with mysticism. These stereotypes include the 
“Negro’s sui generis odor…the Negro’s sui generis good nature…the Negro’s sui generis 
gullibility…” (Fanon 1986:129). For the colonial nations, these become instrumental in 
dismissing the black man’s claims for freedom.  
As regards the achievements of black civilizations, he viewed the priding of oneself with the 
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worked at an abstract level. It did not take into account the daily realities of black existence. 
Fanon says that  
I admit that all the proofs of a Songhai civilization will not change the fact 
that today the Songhais are under-fed and illiterate, thrown between sky 
and water with empty heads and empty eyes (1967:168).  
By appropriating the same logic akin to that of colonialism, Negritude fell into the trap that had 
been laid before it by colonialism. It made them adopt an abstract and therefore ineffectual 
stance towards black liberation. According to Fanon the battle for national liberation ought to 
be national and therefore particular, and not continental or universal. 
While Fanon seem satisfied by the revolutionary role played by the radical intellectuals, it is 
with the conservative intellectuals where his concerns are in the Wretched. While he shows 
that the radical intellectual acts in ways that crystalises the people’s self-understanding in 
relation to the liberation movement, the conservative intellectuals, on the other hand, tend to 
channel their energies to the abstract ideals of the “native” population’s sufferings. Unlike the 
radical intellectuals who seek to extend their view of the world to the whole nation, the 
conservative intellectuals tend to be more politically ambivalent. Fanon therefore wants these 
intellectuals to be geared towards the political realities of the anti-colonial movement; he 
wants them to commit to the immediate conditions of colonial oppression.  
Although he wants concrete commitment from the conservative intellectuals, Fanon 
nevertheless understands that their tearing themselves away from the present to discover 
the past cultures of the colonized people, as something to pride about, that this process is 
necessary in fostering psycho-affective changes in the being of the intellectual who suffered 
tremendous alienation under colonialism. He says that “This tearing away, painful and 
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psycho-affective injuries and the result would be individuals without an anchor, without a 
horizon, colourless, stateless, rootless—a race of angels” (Fanon 1967:175). 
Although it is not explicitly stated in his writings, it is however implicit that Fanon’s 
approach towards politics is underpinned by the philosophy of praxis. In this regard his 
approach to political philosophy resonates with that of Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci. An 
understanding of what praxis entails will shed light on how Fanon wants the “native” 
intellectuals to conduct themselves in relation to the struggle for national liberation.  
According to Antonio Gramsci, philosophy is a social activity in which political ideas are 
generated through the extension of critical intellectual activity to the movement (See 
Gramsci 1971: 321). Gramsci conceives of intellectuals not in terms of the intrinsic nature of 
their intellectual activities but more in accordance with their social functions. Accordingly he 
defines the philosophy of praxis as “consciousness full of contradictions in which the 
philosopher himself, understood both individually and as entire social group, not merely 
grasps the contradictions but posits himself as an element of the contradiction and elevates 
this element to a principle of knowledge and therefore action” (Gramsci 1971:405). As we 
can see here Gramsci adopts a dialectical relationship between the intellectual and the 
movement. He wants to move away from the notion of seeing intellectuals as a distinct 
social category independent of class. 
Gramsci distinguishes between two groups of intellectuals: the traditional and the organic 
intellectuals. The traditional intellectuals mainly perform the usual functions such as that of 
lawyers, teachers, philosophers, scientists etc. The organic intellectuals, on the other hand, 
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conception of the world, and therefore seek to sustain it. Their success is measured by the 
extent to which it achieves to disseminate its propaganda in the various facets of society.  
A broad parallel can be found in Fanon’s discussion of the intellectuals. Fanon, like Gramsci, 
wants the “native” intellectuals to become an enlightening element of the organisation of 
the mass movement against colonialism. The enlightenment is with the view to heightening 
social contradictions in such a way that possibilities for their transcendence become 
immanent. 
Indeed, understanding very well the contradictions associated with colonial oppression, 
Fanon argues that the intellectual first needs to become aware of his estrangement from 
the people (1967:182). It is out of the awareness of his estrangement from the masses that 
the intellectual can be able to bring out colonial social contradictions. Seeing from this 
perspective, it becomes clear that Fanon does not allow for any form of mystification. He 
associates liberation with the full awareness of social realities. His views in this regard differ 
from those of the nationalists. 
For the nationalists mystification is deemed necessary for the sake of liberation. Their form 
of mystification is opposed or is counter to the colonial regime’s mystification. Thus for 
them political education ends once independence is proclaimed. This is the time when the 
masses know who to vote for. For Fanon, on the other hand, all mystification is an obstacle 
to liberation. He believes that true liberation is based on as clear as possible awareness of 
reality. For Fanon political education never ends. Thus party intellectuals ought to aid the 
masses by heightening their level of consciousness so that they can achieve self-
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In order to understand Fanon’s disavowal of the conservative intellectual’s erratic ways, we 
need to examine the issue from the context of Fanon’s understanding of culture and 
violence. For Fanon there is a symbiotic relationship between the violence that takes place 
during the process of decolonization and cultural change. According to this view, during the 
revolution, culture and tradition become unstable, and in the process undergo 
transformation. So by seeking to emphasise the preeminence of culture, the conservative 
intellectual, ipso facto, negates the direction of history of the people and falls into blind 
alleys. It is for this reason, according to Fanon, that the intellectual runs the risk of being 
irrelevant to the nation.  
As mentioned above, Fanon does not necessarily dismiss the potentially positive role of the 
conservative intellectuals. But he suggests that rather than delve onto the past of the 
nation, the intellectual should use the past insofar as it invites and commits him into action 
and hope (1967:187). Clearly distancing himself from the “poets of negritude” Fanon argues 
that:  
We must work and fight with the same rhythm as the people to construct 
the future and to prepare the ground where vigorous shoots are already 
springing up. A national culture is not a folklore or an abstract populism 
that believes it can discover the people’s true nature. It is not made up of 
the inert dregs of gratuitous actions, that is to say actions that are less and 
less attached to the ever-present reality of the people (1967:188).  
So we can see from these lines that Fanon’s injunction is clearly the call into action. And it is 
precisely this point that Fanon shares with Césaire. “Start something!” says Césaire (Cited in 
Fanon 1986: 96). As we shall see below, action for Fanon is not an arbitrary exercise in self 
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Like Gramsci’s organic intellectual, Fanon wants the conservative intellectuals to change 
their ways and act in ways that opens up new possibilities towards the restoration of the 
black-self.  
2.4 Conclusion   
In this chapter we have examined Fanon’s critique of the roles played by the bourgeoisie, 
the political party and the “native” intellectuals. It was shown that their behavior, taking 
into account the assumption of the people during the days of struggle for national 
liberation, has only managed to bring about what I referred to as false sense of liberation. I 
argued that the assumption of independence struggle, that is to say, its ideology was the 
attainment of complete liberation and freedom. But these aspirations have, at least since 
independence, proved to be elusive. The implication of this phenomenon is that liberation 
movements in Africa have, at least to date, failed to bring about palpable change in the lives 
of men and women of Africa who still suffer from hunger, illiteracy, diseases etc. in other 
words liberation movements have failed to bring about radical changes that would bring 
about respect to what many have called decolonisation in Africa. The responsibility for this 
downward spiral was placed on the dishonesty and obscurantism of the three actors, as 
identified by Fanon. This was of course not without the recognition of the economic 
imbalances that exist particularly between the “formerly” colonized world and the 
colonizing powers. 
In order to put an end to subordination and realize genuine liberation, Fanon’s appeal to 
these players is for them to abandon their class conservatism and to become the willing 
servants of the people. According to Fanon liberation would come about if people’s 
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themselves as a people. Moreover this process of political consciousness is necessary in that 
without it, the people may develop a social consciousness which may imperil national 
cohesion. For Fanon it is only by the combination of social and political awareness by the 
masses, acted upon by the middle class, the intellectual and the party leaders that the 
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Chapter 3: Dialectical Humanism 
For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades we must turn over a new leaf, we 
must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.                           
                               (Frantz Fanon) 
Central to Fanon’s revolutionary project is the creation of a universal humanism. As we saw 
in the previous chapters Africans, together with other Third World regions, had through the 
colonial encounter experienced alienation and dehumanisation. Western colonialsm, largely 
influenced by Enlightenment ideas sought to build a humanism which not only excluded 
Africa and other Third World regions but was built on that exclusion. This exclusion 
legitimized racism and the exploitation of people in these regions. Seeing such injustices, 
which were a ubiquitous feature of the colonial system, Fanon posited a counter humanism 
to that of Europe. Through his conception of decolonisation Fanon thought that 
decolonisation would put to an end not only the notion of the colonized man but morally 
recreate Europe itself. He believed that by shattering the colonial world the colonised would 
be on their way to self-creation which, dialectically, would bring Europe back to the level of 
humanity, away from colonial barbarity. Thus for Fanon, decolonization is part of the 
dialectic which leads to a higher humanity.   
In the “Preface” to The Wretched of the Earth Sartre makes mention of the fact that through 
Fanon, “the Third World finds itself and speaks to itself through his voice” (Sartre 1967:9). 
He then urges his fellow European counterparts to listen to Fanon’s voice with the view that 
it would arouse shame among them. And shame, “as Marx said, is a revolutionary 
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Europeans but more at conscientising his African comrades in their fight for national 
liberation. Rather than being preoccupied with moral appeals to Europe, as Sartre does, 
Fanon was more concerned with guiding his comrades from colonial slavery to the 
realisation of their full humanity.  
On this aspect of Fanon’s project Sartre writes, in the Preface to the Wretched, that “Fanon 
is the first since Engels to bring the processes of history into the clear light of day” (Sartre 
1967:12-13). Through his revolutionary humanism, Fanon sought to extend the processes of 
history, history as made through struggle, to the black or the colonized people. These are a 
people which, according to Hegel in his The Philosophy of History, were beset by historical 
inertia.  
The current chapter will examine Fanon’s proposals to prevent the emergence of the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and help put the masses of the people back at the center of 
political processes. I will show this to be part of Fanon’s larger project aimed at privileging 
the underclass and the restoration of black self that remained suppressed under 
colonialism.  
To this end Fanon proposed a number of practical solutions. These included the 
nationalization of the retail trade, the army, political education and the democratization of 
the political party. I have already touched on some of these in the previous chapter so in the 
current chapter I will focus more on the nationalization of the retail trade and the army. This 
should be read as part of Fanon’s cautious advice to African leaders who were fighting for 
the liberation of their people. The remainder of the chapter will focus on Fanon’s 
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would become clear that Fanon conceived of the black’s disalienation as coming into being 
in a dialectical fashion.  
3.1 Privileging the Underclass: Nationalisation 
In order to curb the regression of the state along neo-colonialist lines Fanon urges African 
governments to nationalize the trading sector. As we saw in the previous chapter, after the 
proclamation of independence the “native” elites move to occupy positions which were 
previously held by the colonial bourgeoisie in its exploitation of the local economy. “It 
considers that the dignity of the country and its own welfare require that it should occupy 
all these posts” (Fanon 1967:122). Therefore in order to avoid the emergence of the 
national bourgeois dictatorship Fanon makes various concrete proposals.  
Cautiously he says that “If the government wants to bring the country out of its stagnation 
and set it well on the road towards development and progress, it must first and foremost 
nationalize the middle man’s trading sector” (1986:144). But in saying so Fanon is aware of 
the corruption they may ensue if this sector is placed in the hands of government officials. 
So in order to avoid corruption and bureaucracy he therefore insists that nationalisation of 
this sector ought to be democratic. This means placing the control of this sector in the hands 
of the masses in the form of cooperatives. He says that “Nationalising the intermediary 
sector means organizing wholesale and retail cooperatives on a democratic basis” (Fanon 
1967:145). This requires giving the people some political education and getting them 
interested in “the ordering of public affairs” (Fanon 1967:145). This approach is in line with 
Fanon’s conviction that everything should depend on the people, that if the nation moves 
forward, it should be due to them. Nationalization, therefore, ought to take on a strictly 
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It is important to note here that Fanon’s call for nationalization is at odds with that of the 
national bourgeoisie. The latter’s conception tends to be narrowly concerned with their own 
class interests; based on stepping into the shoes of the former colonial bourgeoisie and as 
such has nothing in it for the masses of the people. He says that for the national bourgeoisie 
“nationalization quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those unfair 
advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period” (1967:122). Contrary to the nationalist 
bourgeoisie’s conception of nationalization, which it deems as “Africanisation”, Fanon views 
nationalization broadly as aimed at bringing dignity onto the lives of the masses languishing 
in poverty 
By political education Fanon does not mean a situation where the leaders want to be 
“supported by the people in the action that they are taking” (Fanon 1967:145). On the 
contrary, Fanon has in mind a situation where political education is geared towards raising 
the people’s level of consciousness. Although Fanon does not expand on these formulations, 
what is crucial is to see how each process—nationalisation, democratisation and 
decentralisation—is dialectically linked to others towards conscientising the masses.   
It is for this reason, of the need to build a national consciousness, that Fanon insists on the 
army being nationalized. He argues that the army should not be organized as an 
autonomous body. This means that the army “should not include any professional soldiers” 
(Fanon 1967:163), and the size of permanent officers “should be reduced to a minimum” 
(Fanon 1967:163). On the other hand, the size of the militia should be increased. He argues 
that the army, by virtue of its national appeal, could provide space for building national 
consciousness and instill national patriotism. The army could also function as a check 
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on building national consciousness and his humanism, the emergence of the neo-colonial 
state arises as an anomaly where in 
National consciousness, instead of being the all embracing crystalisation of 
the innermost hopes of the people, instead of being the immediate and 
most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case 
only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been 
(Fanon 1967:119).    
So in order to avoid the pitfalls of national consciousness Fanon urges African leaders to 
have a clear understanding of the social situation of their people. Only by prioritising their 
needs and raising their level of consciousness could there be progress in their lives. Anything 
other than that politics remains a project of mystifying the people.  
It is important to note that in Fanon’s political project the way out of the social and political 
quagmire is not presented as a single moment such as his call for the nationalization of the 
intermediary sector and the army. On the contrary his approach to disalienation can be 
viewed as forming part of his broad objective towards black disalienation. His engagement 
with the lived experience of the black is evident, among other places, in his interpretations 
of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and his views on the change in behavior 
in relation to Western medicine and the radio in the book A Dying Colonialism.  
As regards medicine Fanon was of the view that although it was a western concept and 
introduced in Algeria at the same time as colonialism, he argued that western medicine 
could still be utilized in Algerian society in order to uplift the lives of men and women there. 
He notes also that since medicine was introduced in Algeria at the same time as racialism 
that “Western medical science, being part of the oppressive system has always provoked in 
the native an ambivalent attitude” (Fanon 1965:121) towards medicine.  Before the 
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such a way that the doctor is always perceived in the same way as the police or the army. 
Speaking of the doctor’s visit to the douar Fanon says that “The doctor who arrives in this 
atmosphere of general constraint is never a “native” doctor but always a doctor belonging 
to the dominant society and very often to the army” (1965:121). Thus the relation of trust 
between the doctor and patient is non-existent in the colonies.  
Under colonialism the doctor is, as Fanon puts it, “both technician and a colonizer” 
(1965:127). But Fanon argues, perhaps because of his partial objectivity as an outsider to 
the Algerian situation, that medicine could be of huge benefit to “native” Algerians despite 
its being part of the oppressive system. He says that “When the discipline considered 
concerns man’s health, when its very principle is to ease pain, it is clear that no negative 
reaction can be justified” (1965:121). It is during the rebellion that the “native’s” attitude 
towards western medicine begins to change. This is a dialectic that results from the 
contradictions of colonial medicine. During the revolution peoples’ habits and attitudes 
undergo radical transformation in such ways that new possibilities are created. Fanon 
argues that it is during the period of struggle that peoples’ attitudes towards medicine are 
transformed and made to embrace the medical technique that will enhance life. It is during 
the revolution that western medicine is stripped of its colonial notions and adapted to the 
needs of Algerians. 
In a similar way, Fanon thought that the radio too could be adapted to the social needs of 
the people. Prior to the revolution the radio represented French presence and French 
culture in Algeria. Thus for the “natives” switching on the radio meant “allowing the 
coloniser’s language to filter into the very heart of the house…Having a radio meant 
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appropriation of the radio by the revolutionary forces in order to organize and inform the 
people introduces dialectical changes into the revolution. The revolution mediated by The 
Voice of Fighting Algeria brought the various fragments of the revolution into unity and in 
the process brought about new possibilities. As Fanon puts it the radio, in essence, “brought 
the nation to life and endowed every citizen with a new status” (1965:96). This brief 
demonstration shows that nationalization does not constitute a single moment towards 
disalienation but like medicine, the radio and political education, forms part of Fanon’s 
larger political project aimed at privileging the masses or what he calls the wretched. It 
demonstrates Fanon’s project, both as psychiatrist and politician, as always geared towards 
putting the wellbeing of the marginalized classes at the centre of political processes.      
I have pointed out that Fanon’s recommendations were meant as preventative measures in 
order to avoid a lapse into neocolonialism rather than being aimed at overthrowing the 
national bourgeoisie dictatorship once it has been established. The absence, in Fanon’s 
theory, on measures to cure the nation state from the sclerosis of the national bourgeois 
dictatorship marks a sore point in Fanon’s political project. Indeed some of Fanon’s scholars 
(McCulloch 1983 and Zahar 1974) have noted this omission in Fanon’s theory. Insofar as my 
knowledge goes Fanon was of the view that since the nationalist bourgeoisie in Africa was 
economically weak the bourgeois phase in Africa will, therefore, “not last indefinitely” 
(1967:140). It is therefore important that Fanon’s recommendations should be read with 
this in mind. Perhaps convinced of the temporality of the bourgeois phase in Africa Fanon 
did not deem it necessary to focus his last book, The Wretched of the Earth, to dealing with 
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Nevertheless Fanon’s omission of this important aspect of his project creates a huge gap in 
his critique of post-liberation failures in Africa.  
Noting this absence Jock McCulloch observes that having coherently described the pitfalls of 
the neocolonial state under the dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie, Fanon leaves 
completely unanswered the question of how the national bourgeoisie ought to be 
dethroned. He says that “Fanon’s theory leaves completely unanswered the question how, 
once established, a dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie is to be overthrown. It is the 
absence of an answer to this question, more than any other single factor, which determines 
the status of Fanon’s theory” (McCulloch 1983:184). Although McCulloch is scornful of 
Fanon for having omitted such an important theoretical aspect, he acknowledges that Fanon 
was mainly concerned with the preventative rather than the curative aspects in his 
approach. He says beyond the description of the bourgeois dictatorship “Fanon outlines the 
means by which the rise of such dictatorships may be prevented, and stresses the necessary 
ordering of national affairs in the spheres of economic, cultural, social and military activity 
to achieve that end” (1983:184). McCulloch could have pointed out that such measures 
ought to be put in place before the rise of national bourgeois dictatorship.           
It must however be noted that Fanon had very little time to finish the Wretched. Having 
been diagnosed with leukemia he knew that his time to finish the book was short. As seen 
above his optimism for the downfall of the national bourgeoisie state is based on his 
assessment that its tenuous hold on power will not last. This is because the bourgeois class 
faces internal contradictions and will therefore be devoured by its own contradictions. For 
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since independence was proclaimed” (Fanon 1967:142) then everything needs to be started 
anew.       
3.2 Creating a New Humanism 
Fanon conceived of the restoration of the black self, and by implication the creation of a 
new humanism, as coming into being dialectically through the process of decolonization. As 
we saw earlier Fanon conceives of decolonization as a complete rupture with the colonial 
system and by implication its racial binaries. If colonialism entails the enslavement of man 
by another as Fanon points out, then the violence of decolonization by the colonised 
shatters not only the colonial world but in the process conscientises and raises the 
individual’s self awareness  in relation the revolutionary struggle. By adopting violence and 
becoming the moving force of the revolution, the “native” becomes conscious of the risk to 
life that freedom entails. Through the rupture with the colonial world the “natives” begin to 
transcend colonial binaries and in the process becomes self-acting. By rupturing with the 
colonial world the “natives” begin a historical journey towards recreating himself. This is 
what Fanon calls creating a new humanism. 
It is generally implicit in his writings that Fanon is undertaking a humanist project. But there 
instances where it comes out explicitly. In Masks he points out that the project he is 
engaged in is one that “is haunted by problems of love and understanding” (1986:10) of 
human needs, “This new humanity cannot do than define a new humanism both for itself 
and for others” (1967:198). The two comments demonstrates Fanon’s project as one that is 
concerned with love and human dignity. The implication for decolonization is that its 
success will be measured by the extent to which it brings back dignity in the lives of the 
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Thus decolonisation for Fanon is not represented by the presidential palace or the new flag, 
as the nationalists thought.  
It is crucial to note here that Fanon did not think that the new humanism was to emerge 
from Europe. He believed that Europe must be rejected not only because it speaks 
hypocritically of humanism and man whilst murdering everywhere, but also because Europe 
has ceased to be the centre of ideas. As Fanon saw it Europe had gone morally bankrupt and 
that the source of a new humanity was to emerge from the Third World itself. He says 
“Today we are present at stasis of Europe. Comrades let us flee from this motionless 
movement where gradually the dialectic is changing into a logic of equilibrium” (1967:253). 
Rather than wasting time mimicking Europe Fanon urges his comrades to leave Europe and 
focus on building this new humanity on their own. He says that “That same Europe where 
they are never done talking of Man…today we know with what sufferings humanity has paid 
for every one of their triumphs of the mind. Come then comrades, the European game has 
finally ended; we must find something different” (Fanon 1967:251).  
According to Nigel Gibson, one who generally writes to elucidate and defend Fanon’s 
position, the dialectic of liberation has never exclusively belonged to Europe anyway, and as 
such needs to be delinked from her. Echoing Fanon, Gibson posits the view that Europe has 
become antidialectical (2003:193). He locates Europe’s moral decadence to Hitler’s 
concentration camps in Nazi Germany. For him Hitler’s concentration camps gave notice 
that Europe was no longer the site of ideas for liberation. “Hitler’s concentration camps 
gave notice that the idea of Europe as the site for the human project had come to an end” 
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It is equally important to note that while Europe had perpetrated untold sufferings on a 
world scale, that Fanon did not propose retribution for her. On the contrary his idea of a 
new humanity includes Europe itself. Fanon was careful to point out that neutralising 
Europe does not entail replacing her with another Europe. On the contrary he pointed out 
that although Europe’s spirit of imperialism had set humanity backwards, for humanity to 
“advance a step farther” the Third World has to come up with new discoveries (1967:254). 
He explains that “Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, 
which would be an obscene caricature” (1967:254). From these lines Fanon proves that he 
did not advocate for punishment for Europe’s crimes. But by so doing he departs from the 
line of his earlier intellectual influence, Aimé Césaire.    
Contrary to Fanon, Aimé Césaire thought that a nation that colonises and dehumanises calls 
for its own punishment. As Césaire puts “a nation which colonises, that a civilization which 
justifies colonization — and therefore force — is already a sick civilization, a civilization that 
is morally diseased, that irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, one 
repudiation to another, calls for its Hitler,  I mean its punishment” (1972: 18). 
Moving a step further than Césaire, Fanon posited an ideal which centered around the 
realization of mutual recognition between blacks and whites, and not punishment. In Masks 
he argues against this very idea and regards as “miserable” those who harbor racial hatred. 
He argues that “In the absolute, the black is no more to be loved than the Czech, and truly 
what is to be done is to set men free” (1986:11).      
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I have thus far juxtaposed Fanon’s idea of humanism in relation to western humanism but 
we are yet to fully understand its intended impact on the colonised black person. In the first 
instance Fanon’s new humanism, at least as presented in the Wretched, is tied and 
dependent on the success of the decolonization process, mediated by conscious action. By 
completely rupturing with colonialism and by politically educating the masses, Fanon 
thought that decolonization would amount to a “veritable creation of a new man” 
(1967:28). With the glare of “history’s floodlights” (Fanon 1967:28) on the “natives”, Fanon 
thought that decolonization would elevate the black man from the status of object towards 
the realisation of his manhood. Decolonisation, argues Fanon, is a project that is rooted in 
man and his human needs. In the words of Nigel Gibson “The extent to which the masses 
continue to play a central role in the postcolonial society determines the success of — 
indeed defines Fanon’s new humanism” (Gibson 2003:195). Fanon’s emphasis on the need 
to prioritize and put ordinary citizens at the centre of politics marks another point of 
difference between his conception of the post liberation state and that of the national 
bourgeoisie. For the latter is constituted by a handful of “native” elites who’s eyes are 
mostly fixated on the former colonial power, who has granted it independence, rather than 
being concerned with the people they lead. 
Thus genuine liberation is something that each citizen can experience in a liberated political 
community. In Revolution Fanon argues that the liberation of the nation is accompanied by 
the liberation of the individual. Liberation for Fanon does not only manifest at a national 
level but also becomes visible at a social level, as when the individual realises his own 
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phenomenon. “An authentic national liberation” Fanon argues, “exists only to the precise 
degree to which the individual has irreversibly begun his own liberation” (Fanon 1967:103).    
Based on his revolutionary humanism Fanon thought that although decolonization as a form 
of social transformation was necessary, he also believed that social change alone was 
inadequate in fostering a new man. For the disappearance of the colonized man to occur, 
change in the social and economic structures of society, Fanon insisted, needed to be 
accompanied by direct intervention at an ideological level. Only through such interventions 
does Fanon think that a colonized people can irreversibly triumph in their fight against 
colonialism  
In Revolution Fanon singles out, not colonialism but the “absence of ideology” as the 
greatest danger that threatens Africa. This comment came just after he had been on a 
reconnaissance trip through Mali in order to assess the possibility of opening up a front on 
the Algerian South Western border in order to supply that front. Fanon says that 
“Colonialism and its derivatives do not, as a matter of fact, constitute the present enemies 
of Africa. In a short time this continent will be liberated. For my part, the deeper I get into 
the cultures and the political circles, the surer I am that the great danger that threatens 
Africa is the absence of ideology” (1967:186).  
This comment highlights Fanon’s concerns about the need for ideology. The events of post-
independence appear to have confirmed Fanon’s concerns about the lack of ideology among 
African liberation movements. He therefore argues that there must be, “as well an 
economic programme, ‘an idea of man and the future of humanity’” (Cited in Nursey-Bray 
1980:140). Hence his first priority as Nursey-Bray observes, is to return human dignity to “all 
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human because conscious and sovereign men dwell there in’” (1980:140).  Thus, although 
social transformation is important: direct intervention at an ideological level is key towards 
the realization of the dignity of the colonised.  
By emphasizing the importance of ideology in creating a new man Fanon is making a similar 
point as the revolutionary Che Guevara. Guevara was aware that bourgeois social ideology 
can outlive the process of social transformation. Thus intervention at an ideological level 
was for Guevara necessary in fostering a new man. He states that “To build communism, a 
new man must be created simultaneously with the material base” (Cited in Nursey-Bray 
1980:141).  
What distinguishes Fanon from Guevara is that Fanon does not prescribe in specific terms 
the nature of the new ideology as Guevara does. While this may appear as a shortfall and 
somewhat self-defeating, I argue that this is in fact in line with Fanon’s philosophical 
approach to existential concerns. Through his existentialist outlook, Fanon thought that 
solutions to man’s problems ought to emerge from the particular material reality that gives 
rise to those problems in the first place. Following Sartre, Fanon thought that it is the 
material conditions that determine theory, and not the converse. Sartre had argued that 
“existence precedes essence” (1947:15). What Sartre means by this is that man does not 
come to the world with predetermined essences. Man only defines himself through the 
choices that he makes. He is “nothing else but what he makes himself” (Sartre 1947:18). In a 
similar way Fanon begins Masks by telling his readers that “I do not come with ultimate 
truths. My consciousness is not illuminated with ultimate radiances” (1986:9). He further 
says that “Man is motion towards the world” (1986:41). By insisting on the immediate, as 











74 | P a g e  
 
objective maxims which, whilst not based on particular material reality, are nonetheless 
supposed to be universally true.    
From this we can see that Fanon rejects a kind of theorization that is abstracted from the 
lived experience of reality. He lambasts intellectuals whose theoretical work has become an 
end in-itself. Against intellectual narcissism he says that  
A permanent dialogue with oneself…where intellectual work became 
suffering and the reality was not at all that of living man, working and 
creating himself, but rather words, but different combinations of 
words (Fanon 1967:257).  
Fanon’s commitment to the immediate and his rejection of abstract thought makes him to 
reject mechanistic explanations of actual historical events and behaviour. As he saw it social 
revolution is not brought about through objective or mechanical forces, but is brought 
about subjectively through human agency. Although he concurs with Marx that “We 
proceed from an economic fact of the present” (Quoted in Pithouse 2003:120), Fanon 
departs from him insofar as the latter was led to conclude that social transformation occurs 
naturally as necessitated by social contradictions that necessitate change from one form of 
production to another. Pithouse sums this up when he says that “Marxism ended up 
replacing a transcendent God with transcendent History” (2003:120). Fanon’s rejection of 
mechanistic explanations leads him, in Revolution, to declare that “Africa will not be free 
through the mechanical development of material forces, but it is the hand of the African and 
his brain that will set into motion and implement the dialectics of the liberation of the 
continent” (1967:173). Concerning decolonisation Fanon further declares that  
It is rigorously true that decolonization is proceeding, but it is rigorously 
false to pretend and to believe that this decolonization is the fruit of an 
objective dialectic which more or less rapidly assumes the appearance of 
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Thus we observe here that Fanon is consistent in placing the black person or the colonized 
at the centre of political processes. He brings to light the idea that if indeed the nation is to 
move forward, it is through the action of the “natives” themselves that such a movement 
can occur. His insistence on prioritising the wretched of the earth is based on the 
importance he places on human dignity as key in realising the black self. This brings us to 
Fanon’s understanding of recognition in fulfilling human dignity.  
3.4 The Colonised and Recognition 
Marx and Engels open The Communist Manifesto by declaring that the “The history of 
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (1967:79). Fanon proceeds from the 
premise that the history of mankind, particularly of the colonized people, consists of 
adversities with which humanity has to overcome in order to achieve freedom and 
recognition. According to Richard Onwuanibe (1983:13-14) this means that mankind has 
suffered from the lack of universalisation and deprivation of human dignity. At the heart of 
Fanon’s project is the desire to attain human dignity for the colonized “natives”. Recognition 
and freedom are regarded by Fanon as key in the drive towards the universalisation of 
human dignity for the colonized who have been relegated to the lower rungs of humanity 
and colonial bondage. As a human problem, recognition forms a key part of Fanon’s 
revolutionary humanism. 
As we shall see below Fanon conceives of the processes leading towards the recognition of 
the colonized people as occurring in a dialectical fashion, revealing inner contradictions and 
coming up with efforts to resolve them. By advocating for the universalisation of recognition 
and human dignity to the dehumanized “natives” Fanon is, in effect, extending the 
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colonized people. By so doing Fanon puts himself in the same line as the great world 
philosophers who have employed dialectical reasoning in understanding human problems of 
which Hegel and Marx, in the West, are good examples in the modern period. In fact, 
Fanon’s conception of recognition as connected to human dignity is, to a large extent, 
derived from Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit. While this is so there are nevertheless, 
important differences in the two authors’ methods. 
Hegel’s intention in the Phenomenology is to describe the evolution of consciousness or 
Spirit in the course of human development. It is particularly in the section of the master and 
slave dialectic that Hegel provides an acute analysis of the dynamics of self-consciousness. 
This provides the model for Fanon’s dialectic. Fanon’s project is an attempt to extend the 
notions of freedom, recognition and human dignity to the black or the colonized people 
who have been dehumanized through violence and racism under colonialism. However 
rather than locating the development of consciousness within the master and slave 
dialectic, Fanon, as we shall see, locates it within the colonial context. Thus the following 
discussion will, in some detail, explore how each of the two authors conceives of the 
dialectic of recognition.    
In Hegel’s philosophy recognition is something that each consciousness desires. However 
recognition is, for Hegel, the product of historical struggle. In the Phenomenology of Spirit 
Hegel argues that “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (1977:111). In other words 
self-consciousness finds self-worth insofar as it is recognised as a unique and autonomous 
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made to recognize those acts as outcomes of an autonomous self and as a being existing in 
its own right (“for-itself”) (See Nash 1988:12).  
For Hegel recognition does not happen automatically as when one consciousness decides to 
recognize another consciousness. Recognition and freedom always results from the process 
of struggle, a struggle to the death. That is, it is through staking one’s life in the struggle to 
the death that freedom can be won. This is because while each self-consciousness is certain 
of itself, it is not so of the other self-consciousness. Since it is not certain of the other and its 
intentions, the other remains a threat to itself. Thus “it’s self certainty has no truth” (Hegel 
1977:113). In order to establish its certainty Hegel contends that the two self-
consciousnesses must engage in a struggle.  
They must engage in this struggle for they must raise their certainty of 
being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their 
own case. And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; 
only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not 
[just] being, not the immediate form in which it appears, not its 
submergence in the expanse of life, but rather there is nothing present in 
it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure 
being-for-itself (Hegel 1977:14). 
As we can see here freedom for Hegel consists in going beyond the “immediate form” of 
existence, that is, beyond the mere certainty of self in the immediate into having your own 
being and your actions recognized in the world as your own and not determined by the 
other. This means that we have values such as freedom and recognition which we regard as 
more important than life itself.  
However the struggle to the death does not necessarily entail the elimination of the other. 
Each is dependent on the other for recognition to occur. The one who emerges victorious in 
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will exist insofar as he performs services for the former. Although the slave may still be 
recognized as a human being “he has not attained to truth as an independent self-
consciousness” (1977:114) and is therefore deprived of his being-for-itself.   
Recognising the importance of freedom and recognition in forming a complete human being 
Fanon appropriates Hegel’s analysis of the development of self-consciousness and adapts it 
to the colonial situation. However, he rejects an analysis of the development of self-
consciousness for the colonized as confined within Hegel’s master and slave dialectic. This is 
because the Hegelian dialectic does not refer to bondage as backed up by power as is the 
case with colonial oppression. This is similar to Sartre’s analysis of the gaze of the other 
discussed in the first chapter. Since bondage in Hegel is not affected by a system of power, 
Fanon says of the Hegelian dialectic that “There is not an open conflict between white and 
black” (Fanon 1986:217). In line with his humanism Fanon prioritises the importance of 
reciprocity in human relations. He argues that each consciousness “wants to be recognized 
as a primal value without reference to life, as a transformation of subjective certainty 
(Gewissheit) into objective truth (Warheit)” (Fanon 1986:218). This struggle for recognition 
overcomes the existence of superior and inferior classes. His interpretation of Hegel as we 
shall see below clarifies the point. Although conflict becomes a central feature for Hegel, 
Fanon observes that at the heart of Hegel’s dialectic, there is “absolute reciprocity” 
(1986:217) that humanity can tap in to. He says that  
At the foundation of Hegelian dialectic there is an absolute reciprocity 
that must be emphasized. It is in the degree to which I go beyond my own 
immediate being that I apprehend the existence of the other as a natural 
and more than natural reality. If I close the circuit, if I prevent the 
accomplishment of movement in two directions, I keep the other within 
himself. Ultimately, I deprive him of this being-for-itself (Fanon 
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Hence for Fanon reciprocity, freedom and recognition constitute the salient features of 
human dignity and therefore ought to be accorded to each human being. However Fanon 
anticipates the possibility of the other being reluctant to reciprocate. “He who is reluctant 
to recognize me opposes me” says Fanon (1986:218). Thus it is only when the other refuses 
to “recognize me” that I am compelled to engage in a struggle to claim recognition for 
myself. “In a savage struggle I am willing to accept convulsions of death, invisible 
dissolution” (Fanon 1986:218).  
Without dwelling much on the Hegelian dialectic it suffices for me to say that the slave 
remains with a chance of rising above servitude towards regaining his humanity. This occurs 
through the anguish endured as the result of the work he has to perform for the master and 
his daily contact with reality in which he transforms the tools at his disposal to achieve his 
purposes. This is also the case with Fanon’s analysis of the situation of the colonized. 
Reduced to the level of slaves by colonialism, Fanon argues that it is through struggle that 
the “natives” can attain to their freedom and recognition. Fanon is not so much opposed to 
a kind freedom that is willingly granted by the other (the colonial masters) without the 
colonized themselves having to fight for it, but thinks that freedom so achieved is not real 
freedom. For Fanon it is when the colonized themselves act upon their oppressive 
conditions that they come to appreciate the cost of freedom.  
By insisting on the need to fight, Fanon has in mind the impact that action has on 
consciousness. In his scheme of things there is a dialectical interplay between action and 
consciousness. Thus by insisting on the colonized people’s to be self-propelled in their 
march to freedom Fanon anticipates the disentangling of the colonized peoples’ minds and 
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had become accustomed to only receiving orders and not being made to think on their own 
under colonialism. Hence the project of raising the level of the “natives” consciousness in 
the process of social transformation is described by Richard Pithouse, a project within a 
project. “Men change at the same time that they change the world” says Fanon (1965:30). 
Thus contrary to the idea that an outsider, say a philosopher, may intervene by importing a 
new theory in determining the direction of dialectical movement, Fanon argues for a 
dialectical movement whereby the form and content of the movement is itself determined 
by the immediate concrete reality in space and time. This demonstrates the importance that 
Fanon places on freedom and recognition that is grounded in conscious action. 
When insisting on freedom as the product of consciousness Fanon also has in mind the 
dangers to human dignity that may arise if freedom and recognition are granted without 
there being a challenge to human dignity once inferiority and superiority complexes have 
set in. Historically this was the case with the French-speaking blacks particularly in the 
Antilles. Since black people there have defended French values, values which are not of 
their own, and fought for inclusion into white, French society, these people, according to 
Fanon, have not attained genuine liberation in the manner I have described above. Their 
assimilation into French society is described by Fanon when he says that they have simply 
“went from one way of life to another, but not from one life to another” (1986:220). He 
further bemoans the fact that “From time to time he [“the French-Negro”] has fought for 
Liberty and Justice, but these were always white liberty and white justice; that is, values 
secreted by his masters” (Fanon 1986:221). As Fanon perceptively observes these people, 
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their French colonial masters. They, therefore, have no sense of the cost and anguish that 
freedom entails. 
Having diagnosed the Antillean blacks as suffering from the white mask neurosis Fanon 
believes that it is by asserting their existence that the Antilleans can become free again. 
They need to feel the “anguish of liberty”. Only thus will the Antillean’s white mask come 
off. For it is in struggle that a new humanism, according to Fanon, has a chance to triumph. 
The riddance of the colonized personality and the ushering of the new man, according to 
Fanon, require individuals who have the courage to take their destinies into their own 
hands. He declares in Masks that man is “Yes to life, Yes to love. Yes to generosity. But man 
is also a no. No to scorn of man. No to degradation of man. No to exploitation of man. No to 
the butchery of what is most human in man: freedom” (Fanon 1967:222). For Fanon it is 



















82 | P a g e  
 
Bibliography 
Alexander, A., Gibson N.C. and Mngxitama, A. (eds.). 2008. Biko Lives! New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Beckett, P.A. 1972. “Frantz Fanon and Sub-Saharan Africa: Notes on the Contemporary 
Significance of His Thought.” Africa Today, 19:59-72. 
Bhabha, H. 1986. “Remembering Fanon.” Foreword to Black Skin White Masks, translated by 
Charles Lam Markham. London: Pluto Press. 
Burke, E. 1976. “Frantz Fanon's ‘The Wretched of the Earth.’” Daedalus, 105:127-135. 
Cesairé, A. 1972. Discourse on Colonialism, translated by Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly 
Review Press. 
Dane, R. 1994. “When Mirror Turns Lamp: Frantz Fanon as Cultural Visionary.” Africa Today, 
41: 70-91. 
Duquette, D.A. 1989. “Marx's Idealist Critique of Hegel's Theory of Society and Politics.” The 
Review of Politics, 51:218-240. 
Fairchild, H.H. 1994. “Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth in Contemporary 
Perspective”, Journal of Black Studies, 25(2):191-199. 
Fieldhouse, D.K. 1981. Colonialism 1870 – 1945. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  
Fanon, F. 1965. A Dying Colonialism, translated by Haakon Chevalier. New York: Grove Press. 
Fanon, F. 1967. The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance Farrington. London: 
Penguin Books. 
Fanon, F. 1967. Toward the African Revolution, translated by Haakon Chevalier. New York: 











83 | P a g e  
 
Fanon, F. 1986. Black Skin, White Masks, translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: 
Grove Press. 
Forsythe, D. 1973. “Frantz Fanon — The Marx of the Third World.” Phylon, 34:160-170. 
Gibson, N. 1996. “Jammin’ the Airwaves and Tuning into the Revolution: The Dialectics of 
the Radio in L’An V la Révolution algeriénne.” (In Gordon, L., Sharpley-Whiting T.D. 
and White, R.T. (eds.), Fanon: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.) 
Gibson, N. 1999. “Beyond Manicheanism: Dialectics in the Thought of Frantz Fanon.” Journal 
of Political Ideologies, 4(3):337–364. 
Gibson, N. 1999. “Thoughts About Doing Fanonism in the 1990s.” College Literature, 26:96-
117. 
Gibson, N. 2003. Fanon: The Postcolonial Imaginary. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gordon, L. 1995. Fanon and the Crisis of European Man, an Essay on Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences. London: Routledge. 
Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Grohs, GK. 1968. “Frantz Fanon and the African Revolution.” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 6(4):543-556. 
Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V Miller. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Honneth, A. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict, 
translated by Joel Anderson. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Loomba, A. 1998. Colonialism/Postcolonialism. London: Routledge.  











84 | P a g e  
 
Martinez-Saenz, M. 2004. “Che Guevara's New Man: Embodying a Communitarian Attitude.” 
Latin American Perspectives, 31(6):15-30. 
Marx, K. 1954. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, translated by Samuel 
Moore and Edward Aveling. London: Lawrence and Wishart.  
Marx, K. & Engels, F. 1967. The Communist Manifesto. London: Penguin Books. 
McCulloch, J. 1983. Black Soul White Artifact: Fanon’s Clinical Psychology and Social Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nash, A. 1988. “Marxism, Hegel and the Philosophical Foundations of Social Revolution”, 
paper for Marxist theory seminar, 14 October 1988. 
Nursey-Bray, P. 1980. “Race and Nation: Ideology in the Thought of Frantz Fanon.” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 18(1):135-142. 
Onwuanibe, R.C. 1983. A Critique of Revolutionary Humanism: Frantz Fanon. Missouri: 
Warren H. Green Inc. 
Perinbam, BM. 1973. “Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasantry — The Algerian Case.” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 11(3):427-445. 
Pithouse, R. 2003. ''That the Tool Never Possess the Man: Taking Fanon's Humanism 
Seriously”, Politikon, 30(1):107-131. 
Posnock, R. 1997. “How It Feels to Be a Problem: Du Bois, Fanon, and the ‘Impossible Life’ of 
the Black Intellectual.” Critical Inquiry, 23:323-349. 
Prashad, V. 2007. The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. New York: The 
New Press. 
Presbey, G.M. 1996. “Fanon and the Role of Violence in Liberation: A Comparison with 
Gandhi and Mandela.” (In Gordon, L., Sharpley-Whiting T.D. and White, R.T (eds.), 











85 | P a g e  
 
Ranuga, T.K. 1986. “Frantz Fanon and Black Consciousness in Azania (South Africa).” Phylon, 
47: 182-191. 
Said, E. 1995. Orientalism. London: Penguin Books 
Sartre, J-P. 2001. Colonialism and Neocolonialism, translated by Haddour, A., Brewer, S. and 
McWilliams, T. New York & London: Routledge.  
Sartre, J-P. 1958. Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
translated by Hazel E. Barnes. London: Methuen Ltd.  
Sartre, J-P. 1947. Existentialism, translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: Philosophical 
Library.  
Sonnleitner, M.W. 1987. “Of Logic and Liberation: Frantz Fanon on Terrorism.” Journal of 
Black Studies, 17(3):287-304. 
Taiwo, O. 1996. “On the Misadventures of National Consciousness: A retrospect on Frantz 
Fanon’s Gift of Prophesy.” (In Gordon, L., Sharpley-Whiting, T.D. and White, R.T. 
(eds.), Fanon: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.) 
Wall, I.M. 1977. “The French Communists and the Algerian War.” Journal of Contemporary 
History, 12(3): 521-543. 
Wallerstein, I. 2009. “Reading Fanon in the 21st Century.” New Left Review 57:1-9. 
Zahar, R. 1974. Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation, translated by Willfried F. Feuser. 
New York: Monthly Review Press.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
